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BEYOND BELLOTTI
Adam Winkler*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the two decades since the United States Supreme Court first
held unconstitutional a state ban on corporate political speech con-
cerning ballot initiative measures in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,1 the importance of the initiative2 process in state governance
has grown remarkably. In the last decade alone, the number of state
ballot measures decided by voters has more than doubled from forty-
one to ninety.3 Over that same period, the Court has unsettled the le-
gal landscape of corporate electoral speech doctrine. In the notable
decisions in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL)4 and
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,5 the Court has seemingly
undermined the rule and reasoning of Bellotti. Due to doctrinal
shifts, it is unclear whether and to what extent states can now regu-
late corporate speech relating to ballot initiatives-that is whether
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. I am indebted to Scott
Bowman, Rick Hasen, Ken Karst, Dan Lowenstein, and the editors of this re-
view for their insightful comments and suggestions on an early draft of this ar-
ticle. Special thanks to Melissa Bomes for her encouragement and support.
1. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
2. The terms "initiative," "referendum," "ballot measure," and "ballot
proposition" are often used interchangeably. To be technically precise, initia-
tives and referendums are two different means of governing through the
mechanisms of direct democracy. The initiative allows voters to propose a law
or constitutional amendment by petition, which is then voted on directly by the
people. See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 259 (1995). In contrast, the referendum allows voters to approve
or reject a law either already passed by the legislature or proposed by the leg-
islature. See id; see also THOMAS E. CRONiN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INITIATIvE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 2 (1989).
3. See Peter Schrag, California Here We Come, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1998, at 20.
4. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
5. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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corporate electoral speech doctrine has moved beyond Bellotti and, if
so, how far and in which direction.
The purpose of this Article is to assess the Court's doctrinal
movement and answer the questions of whether and how far the con-
stitutional law of corporate political speech on ballot initiatives has
moved beyond Bellotti. These questions are significant because state
lawmakers and lawyers remain uncertain as to the appropriate scope
of regulation in the ever-increasing sphere of popular government
known as the initiative process. Although neither MCFL nor Austin
purported to overrule Bellotti,6 numerous scholars argue that these
cases-which stand for the proposition that states can prohibit busi-
ness corporations from financing independent expenditures relating
to candidates from general treasury funds 7 -"stand[] in absolute
contradiction ' 8 to the rationale of Bellotti. Whereas Bellotti reasoned
that political speech does not lose its protection "simply because its
source is a corporation," 9 Austin found that "the unique legal and
economic characteristics of corporations" 10 can legitimize regulation
on how corporations finance their political speech to influence elec-
tions. Because Bellotti dealt with corporate speech on initiatives and
MCFL and Austin with corporate speech regarding candidates, no
one can be certain if Bellotti's rule survives MCFL's and Austin's
reasoning.
This uncertainty is put in bold relief by a lawsuit pending in
Montana over that state's recently enacted law requiring corporations
to finance initiative speech through segregated, not general treasury,
funds. In Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright,II several
business entities have challenged this provision of Montana's
6. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 657, 659 (citing Bellotti as binding precedent).
7. See id. at 668-69.
8. Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Ap-
proach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 587, 613 (1991) (noting Austin's contradiction to Bellotti); see also
Gerald G. Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the "New Corrup-
tion" Waiting for the Court, 44 VAND. L. REV. 767, 780 (1991) (distinguishing
both Austin and MCFL from Bellotti).
9. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.
10. Austin, 494 U.S. at 658.
11. CV 97-6-H-CCL (D. Mont. Feb. 18, 1998).
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election code. 12 The Montana law was modeled after the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Austin and directly poses the thorny question of
whether corporate electoral speech doctrine has moved beyond Bel-
lotti, and if so, how far. 13 The Montana litigation invites us to ex-
amine critically the post-Bellotti developments in both legal doctrine
and electoral politics to determine the boundaries of constitutionally
permissible regulation of the corporate voice in the initiative process.
This Article contends that Bellotti rested on three pillars of rea-
soning: conceptual, evidentiary, and theoretical. Conceptually, the
Justices based their judgment of the corporate initiative speech ban
on a particular understanding of "corruption"-one that encompassed
only financial quid pro quo deals between candidates and contribu-
tors, and hence was inapplicable to ballot measure campaigns. 14 The
second pillar was evidentiary, as the Court found the record in that
case to lack evidence that corporations exerted a significant influence
in ballot elections to justify their silencing. 15 The third pillar was the
Court's theoretical approach to the constitutional principle of free-
dom of speech, which focused on the informational needs of recipi-
ents of corporate speech and extended corporate speech rights ac-
cordingly.'
Since Bellotti, each of these three pillars of reasoning have been
weakened, modified, or supplemented by developments in both judi-
cial doctrine and electoral politics. With regard to corruption, the
growth of the initiative process, issue advocacy, and the now fre-
quent ties between candidates and ballot measures means that ballot
expenditures may in fact pose a risk of financial quid pro quo cor-
ruption. Moreover, as others have noted, the Court's conception of
"corruption" has been supplemented by MCFL and Austin. I argue,
however, that commentators have misinterpreted the Court's rulings.
These cases do not stand for the proposition that states can attempt to
equalize the voices of participants in political debate, as commenta-
tors have claimed. Rather, they hold that corruption can be found
when a corporation uses shareholders' money to support electoral
12. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-236 (1997).
13. See infra notes 32-73 and accompanying text.
14. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
15. See id. at 789-90.
16. See id. at 783.
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politics they have not agreed to. MCFL and Austin establish a new
conception of "corruption" that I term "other people's money" cor-
ruption.
The evidentiary basis for the Bellotti Court's decision has also
been undermined over the past two decades. In numerous articles,
scholars have attempted to show that there is evidence proving that
corporations can overwhelm the initiative process. I contend, how-
ever, that these scholars have often settled for data analyses that can-
not support the conclusions scholars derive from them. To compre-
hend the potential for corporate influence over ballot measures
requires a broader view of the mechanisms of communication in
elections, which can indeed pose a threat of electoral manipulation by
large corporate media conglomerates. Yet even this broader view de-
fies the specificity and concreteness necessary to satisfy a court of
law and the threat remains potential rather than actual. Nevertheless,
by shifting the focus of the "corruption" inquiry in MCFL and Austin,
the Court has made the evidentiary question of corporate dominance
moot. Now the relevant evidentiary question should be whether a
corporation has shareholder consent for its political expenditures in
elections.
The theoretical pillar of Bellotti is in need of adjustment to re-
flect "other people's money" corruption. I show that the Bellotti
Court's listener-based theoretical framework is too infirm to support
unlimited corporate initiative speech rights. I then argue that a
popular theoretical alternative which is also said to protect unlimited
corporate political speech-Martin Redish's constitutive theory-
rests on faulty assumptions. Indeed, constitutive theory actually sup-
ports the conception of "other people's money" corruption at the
heart of MCFL and Austin. I then propose an alternative theoretical
framework to support "other people's money" corruption based on
long-standing principles of political association found in organiza-
tional mandatory fees cases (involving union dues, state bar dues,
and student fees).
Having established the ways in which doctrine and electoral
politics have moved beyond Bellotti, I next consider the impact of
these moves on several current corporate electoral influence contro-
versies. First, I assess the constitutionality of the Montana law and
conclude that it is of questionable validity due to substantial
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overbreadth. Then I examine how moving beyond Bellotti may jus-
tify other campaign finance reforms related to business corporations,
including regulation of corporate political action committee (PAC)
fund-raising, bans on corporate financing of PAC administrative ex-
penses, and limitations on corporate soft money contributions to po-
litical parties.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a brief introduc-
tion to the initiative process and its historical background. It then
provides an overview of the Montana corporate speech regulation at
issue in Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright and of the
most significant precedents that will determine its outcome: Bellotti,
MCFL, and Austin. Part III identifies and analyzes the three pillars of
the Court's reasoning in Bellotti and shows how these pillars have
been affected by doctrinal and political developments. Finally, in Part
IV, I consider the effect of moving beyond Bellotti on the Montana
law and other corporate-centered campaign finance reforms.
II. CORPORATE ELECTORAL SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Business Corporations and the Initiative Process
Instituted in twenty-three states around the beginning of the
twentieth century, 17 the citizen initiative was part of a larger politics
of progressive governmental reform in the West and Midwest. The
primary objective of this reform movement was to reclaim govern-
mental power from "special interests"-a vague term used at the time
to describe the all-powerful railroads, the industrial, manufacturing,
and agricultural trusts, and the large modem corporations emerging
from the post-Civil War industrialization. 18  Among the reforms
achieved by this movement were the Seventeenth Amendment (pro-
viding for direct election of Senators), 19 the Nineteenth Amendment
17. See CRONIN, supra note 2, at 51.
18. For discussion of California's experience with the Southern Pacific
Railroad, see Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the
Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1165, 1184-85 (1998).
For a broader history of the period and of the underlying societal changes giv-
ing rise to reform, see ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-
1920 (1967).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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(enfranchising women),2 the busting up and regulation of combina-
tions in the Sherman Antitrust Act,2' the outlawing of political pa-
tronage,22 the institution of laws banning a host of "corrupt practices"
in electoral politics, and the creation of state-wide citizen initiatives.
While each of these efforts sought to enhance the power of the
people, the initiative was designed to be an especially effective way
to circumvent legislatures many viewed as captured by moneyed in-
23terests. The initiative would provide the citizenry with the ability
to legislate directly, without threat of the legislature later reversing
the citizenry's action.24 Not only would voters decide policy issues
directly, but the measures they voted on would be sponsored by the
people themselves; they, not the special interests, would control the
political agenda of the initiative. To obtain placement on the ballot,
supporters would be required to obtain a specified number of signa-
tures-usually around five percent of the total number of voters in
the previous gubernatorial election-thus insuring the agenda was set
by the grass-roots instead of by moneyed interests.
Both critics and proponents of the initiative process now admit
that, in practice, the initiative has not lived up to its promise of re-
storing the power of the people. "It was supposed to be something to
give people the right to circumvent the stranglehold that the special
interests had on the legislature," says one commentator. "But now
what's happened is that the special interests are the ones that can af-
ford to do the initiatives. 25 A study by the California Commission
on Campaign Financing conducted in 1992 concluded that the aver-
age cost of obtaining the signatures required to earn a place on the
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
21. For histories of the remarkable passage of the Sherman Antitrust law,
see WILLIAM LETviN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: TiE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT (1965); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE
TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963).
22. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1374 (1987).
23. See CRONIN, supra note 2, at 43-50.
24. See, e.g., Manheim & Howard, supra note 18, at 1197-98 (describing
how initiatives in California are protected from later reversal by the legisla-
ture).
25. Todd S. Purdum, When Lawmakers Waffle, and Sometimes Before,
Voters Turn to the Ballot Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998 at A 18 (quot-
ing California State Senator John Burton).
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ballot was over $1 million.26 Only sixteen years earlier, the cost was
considerably less, at $45,000.27 Professional circulating firms have
been established, rendering the process of gathering signatures more
like a commercial transaction than a political movement-a process
devoid of political debate and often achieved without the signatories
even knowing anything substantive about the measure.2 8 Some firms
even offer a money-back guarantee that they can gather the necessary
signatures for virtually any ballot proposition. Consequently, "any-
one willing to put up the funds can buy a place on the ballot."29 Now
the initiative agenda is determined more by corporations or interest
groups than by ordinary people operating among the grass-roots.
30
Corporate influence on the initiative process is also felt after the
ballot has been set. As initiative activity increased since the 1970s,
the amount of money spent by business corporations to sway voters
has also increased. Each election year, voters are bombarded with
fifteen and thirty-second television advertisements, billboards, and
direct-mail designed to gamer their votes. In California, more money
is spent lobbying voters on a handful of ballot propositions than is
spent lobbying legislators on the hundreds of bills that come to the
Assembly floor.3 ' Initiatives have become big business-and big
business has integrated itself into the initiative process.
It is therefore not surprising to see a rekindling of efforts to
regulate the corporate voice in politics. Yet any such regulation must
pass the exacting First Amendment scrutiny of the courts, which
26. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY
BY INITIATIvE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
13 (1992).
27. See id.
28. See CRONIN, supra note 2, at 63-64.
29. Daniel H. Lowenstein & Robert M. Stem, The First Amendment and
Paid Initiative Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 175, 199 (1989).
30. Another adverse consequence of modem initiative practice is its pen-
chant for laws whose harm is felt disproportionately by racial, ethnic, or social
minorities. See e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Bar-
rier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); but see Richard Briffault,
Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1364-66 (1985) (disagreeing
with Professor Bell's analysis of initiatives).
31. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, supra note
26, at 15.
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have often looked unfavorably-if inconsistently-upon restrictions
of political speech sponsored by corporate enterprises.
B. Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright
Montana shares in the long history of fighting corporate influ-
ence in the political process. In 1906, Montana became one of the
twenty-three states of the Progressive Era that adopted the initiative
mechanism as a method of reasserting the citizenry's political
authority.32 A few years later, in 1912, Montana passed the Corrupt
Practices Act to further limit the political power of corporations,
banning corporate spending intended to promote or defeat any politi-
cal party or candidate.33 For sixty years, the law was interpreted to
ban corporate spending on initiatives until the Montana Supreme
Court found the Act ambiguous in its scope in 1972.34 In response,
the Montana legislature amended the Corrupt Practices Act to clarify
that corporate initiative spending was unlawful on penalty of loss of
charter, a substantial fine, or prohibition on conducting business in
the state.
35
Although the complete ban on corporate spending on ballot
campaigns was subsequently overturned by the courts, 36 in 1997
Montana adopted a new law regulating the source of corporate politi-
cal expenditures used to influence ballot measures.37 The 1997 law
provides that "a business corporation, nonprofit corporation, relig-
ious corporation, professional corporation, business trust, [among
other enumerated business entities] ... may not make a contribution
or an expenditure in connection with a ballot issue or to a political
committee that supports or opposes a ballot issue." 38 The law further
states that it "does not prohibit the establishment or administration of
32. See CRONIN, supra note 2, at 51. Since the Progressive Era, another
four states have adopted some form of direct democracy to enable voters to ap-
prove or reject laws or constitutional amendments. See id.
33. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4744, 94-1469 (1947).
34. See State ex rel. Nybo v. District Court, 492 P.2d 1395, 1399 (Mont.
1972).
35. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4744, 23-4768 (1975).
36. See C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254, 1266 (D.
Mont. 1976), aff'd, 583 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978).
37. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-236 (1997).
38. Id. § 13-35-236(1).
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a separate, segregated fund to be used for making political contribu-
tions or expenditures if the fund consists only of voluntary contribu-
tions solicited from individuals who are shareholders, employees, or
members" of a covered organization. 39 There are no limits to the
amount of money a segregated fund can spend in attempting to influ-
ence the outcome of a ballot measure. However, corporations cannot
use general treasury funds to support or oppose ballot measures.
Soon after enactment, the law was challenged in court by the
Montana Chamber of Commerce, a construction company, several
industry associations, and other businesses. The plaintiffs claim,
among other things, that the law is an unconstitutional infringement
of their First Amendment speech rights. The federal district judge in
this case, Charles Lovell, has recently rejected the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment and trial is slated to begin in November,
1998. The ultimate outcome of the Montana case will turn on how
District Judge Lovell, the judges on the court of appeals, and perhaps
ultimately the Justices of the Supreme Court understand and interpret
the tangled web of precedents on campaign finance, corporate politi-
cal speech, and ballot initiative expenditures. Several Supreme Court
precedents impinge on and supply countervailing pressures on the
Montana law, which occupies the unsettled doctrinal area between
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellottz' ° and the Court's more re-
cent rulings in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life41 and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.42
Bellotti is the case with the most similar facts: a state law re-
stricting corporate speech in ballot campaigns. In Bellotti, two banks
challenged a Massachusetts law making it illegal for business corpo-
rations and banks to finance political speech on ballot measures, un-
less they were directly affected by the measures.43 Massachusetts'
ban was an outright prohibition. It made no exception for corporate
speech funded by PACs. As the Court would later characterize it, the
39. Id. § 13-35-236(3).
40. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
41. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
42. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
43. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767.
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Massachusetts law amounted to a "complete foreclosure of any op-
portunity for political speech"44 by the corporation.
The Court, per Justice Lewis Powell Jr., invalidated the Massa-
chusetts law on First Amendment grounds. The Court's reasoning
rested on three determinations. First, the Court rejected Massachu-
setts' claim that the speech of "wealthy and powerful" corporations
might corrupt the political process by "drown[ing] out other points of
view."45 According to the Court, this was not the type of corruption
states had a substantial interest in preventing.4 6 Second, the Court
determined that the record evidence was insufficient to justify the
broad prohibition on corporate initiative speech. The evil the state
wished to prevent was merely hypothetical because there was "no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelm-
ing or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or
that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in
government" due to corporate political participation.47 Finally, the
Court reasoned that the silencing of corporations offended the First
Amendment value of providing the public with a diversity of views
and information. 48 According to the Court, it was irrelevant to the
First Amendment whether the speaker was a corporation or a natural
person.
49
Bellotti remains the Court's seminal ruling on corporate speech
in ballot campaigns. But while it is undoubtedly relevant to deter-
mining the constitutionality of Montana Chamber of Commerce, it
does not necessarily require the courts to invalidate the Montana law.
Bellotti is distinct from the Montana case in one essential respect.
Unlike the Massachusetts law invalidated in Bellotti, which imposed
a complete ban on corporate initiative speech,50 the Montana law al-
lows corporate political speech so long as it is financed through
44. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 259 n.12 (1986); see also Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Basic Princi-
ples or Theoretical Tangles: Analyzing the Constitutionality of Government
Regulation of Campaign Finance, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 589, 600 (1988).
45. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
46. See id. at 789-90.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. See id. at 777.
49. See id. at 776.
50. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259 n.12.
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segregated funds or PACs. By making this allowance, the framers of
the Montana law attempted to satisfy the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in two post-Bellotti corporate electoral speech cases: MCFL
and Austin.
If Bellotti stood for broad protection for corporate political par-
ticipation, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life51 represented a significant step towards the constitutionality
of restrictions on corporate political speech in elections. Section
441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) made it illegal
for all corporations to use general treasury funds to finance inde-
pendent expenditures expressly advocating the defeat or election of
candidates for federal office.52 To the extent corporations wished to
fund independent expenditures to support candidates, the law re-
quired them to establish separate segregated funds, or PACs.53 The
Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL
after the non-profit corporation formed to advance the anti-abortion
cause published a newsletter financed with general treasury funds
prior to the 1978 primary elections identifying candidates who sup-
ported MCFL's pro-life position.54 The Court, per Justice William
Brennan, held section 441b unconstitutional as applied to MCFL's
publication.
55
The Court's decision is significant for two reasons: its recogni-
tion of the potentially corrupting influence of business corporations
on the political process, and its distinct First Amendment treatment
of the speech of non-profit advocacy corporations as compared to
that of business corporations. 56 With regard to the corrupting influ-
ence of corporations on the political process, Justice Brennan's
opinion explains that:
[d]irect corporate spending on political activity raises the
prospect that resources amassed in the economic market-
place may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the po-
litical marketplace .... The resources in the treasury of a
51. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
52. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1997).
53. See id. § 441b(a), (b)(2)(C) (1997).
54. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243-45.
55. See id. at 263.
56. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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business corporation... are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect
instead the economically motivated decisions of investors
and customers. The availability of these resources may
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even
though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of
the power of its ideas.
57
The Court in MCFL realized that the potential for business corpora-
tions to amass immense holdings of capital from people who do not
necessarily support corporations' political agenda can have a dis-
torting effect on elections.
As quickly as he recognized the political dilemma posed by cor-
porate wealth, Justice Brennan made an important distinction be-
tween non-profit advocacy corporations and business corporations.
5 8
Unlike business corporations, the general treasury funds of non-profit
advocacy corporations do reflect political support for the group's
political ideas. A non-profit advocacy group, "MCFL was formed to
disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has
available are not a function of its success in the economic market-
place, but its popularity in the political marketplace."5 9  Thus,
MCFL's use of general treasury funds to finance political speech in
support of candidates did not carry the risk of "unfair deployment of
wealth" 60 gained through the corporate form. As a result, MCFL
could not be required to establish a separate segregated fund for
electoral speech.
In Austin, the Court applied MCFL's reasoning to uphold a state
ban on business corporations financing electoral speech designed to
help candidates through general treasury funds. 61 The Court in Aus-
tin upheld provisions of Michigan's Campaign Finance Act prohib-
iting independent expenditures by business corporations in connec-
tion with candidate elections, unless those expenditures were
financed through segregated funds or PACs. The Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, a non-profit corporation formed to promote local
57. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257-58.
58. See id. at 259.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 668-69.
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businesses and financed by business interests, unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the Michigan law.62 While noting the important speech inter-
ests at stake for the Chamber of Commerce, the Court held that
Michigan had a compelling interest in preventing business corpora-
tions from unfairly diverting their economic resources to political
ends.63 Borrowing heavily from MCFL, Justice Thurgood Marshall,
writing for the majority, explained that the restriction on corporate
independent expenditures was necessary to alleviate "the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas."
64
Although the Chamber of Commerce itself was a non-profit cor-
poration, the Court reasoned that it was more akin to a business cor-
poration than an advocacy corporation-such as MCFL-on the ba-
sis of three distinguishing features. First, the Chamber of
Commerce's explicit purpose, as reflected in its corporate bylaws,
was not purely political advocacy. Unlike MCFL, whose articles of
incorporation specified the organization's core ideological and politi-
cal nature, the Chamber of Commerce's articles identified many pur-
poses, including providing group insurance and litigation activities,
and staging politically neutral educational seminars for local busi-
nesses.66 Second, the Chamber of Commerce had members who
might disagree with the organization's political agenda but who had
economic disincentives from disassociating.67 In contrast, MCFL's
members joined specifically to further that organization's political
agenda and thus would be unlikely to dissent.6 ' Finally, MCFL ac-
cepted no contributions from businesses and was "independen[t]
from the influence of business corporations," 69 whereas three-
quarters of the members of the Chamber of Commerce were business
62. See id. at 656.
63. See id. at 659-60.
64. Id. at 660.
65. See id. at 662.
66. See id. at 662-63.
67. See id. at 663.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 664.
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corporations. As a result, business corporations were able to cir-
cumvent legitimate limits on their ability to contribute to candidates
"by funneling money through the Chamber's general treasury."
71
Although much of the rhetoric of Austin was broad, the ruling it-
self was more narrow. The Michigan law did not ban all corporate
political speech expenditures for candidates, only those funded by the
corporation's general treasury. Under the Michigan law, business
corporations remained free to establish segregated funds or PACs to
finance electoral speech to which managers, officers, employees, or
shareholders could contribute money in the corporation's name.72
The law upheld in Austin did not prohibit corporate speech for candi-
dates; it only required that corporations avoid using general treasury
funds to finance their speech.73
The method by which corporate initiative speech is permitted
under the Montana law-through segregated funds-mirrors the
MCFL and Austin Courts' reasoning that prohibitions on the business
corporation's use of general treasury funds for electoral speech are
legitimate, so long as segregated funds or PACs are available alter-
natives. Yet MCFL and Austin, because they involved limits on cor-
porate speech to support candidates, not ballot measures, are no more
directly on point than Bellotti.
In other words, Montana's law occupies the middle ground be-
tween the complete ban on corporate initiative speech stricken in
Bellotti, and the source-of-funding requirements for corporate candi-
date speech upheld in Austin. To resolve the constitutional contro-
versy, the courts will either have to construe each of the relevant de-
cisions so that they form a coherent and consistent body of rules, or
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Because a corporate PAC will be controlled and operated by corporate
managers, it is essentially the same people deciding what the corporation will
say, where it will say it, and how much to spend to say it. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe that corporations forced to resort to PACs will cease
speaking. Indeed, many large corporations currently funnel their political
speech through active PACs. Thus, in my view, it is incorrect to conclude that
Austin kept a highly relevant voice from being heard at all "or silenc[ed] an
important voice entirely." See Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Cor-
ruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 74 (1997).
73. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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have to sort out which of the cases provides the most persuasive legal
principles. The judges and Justices must determine if the law of cor-
porate initiative speech has moved beyond Bellotti and, if so, how
much.
III. BELLOTTI AND BEYOND
Making sense of the doctrinal entanglements on the issue of cor-
porate political speech in elections is not the courts' job alone. For
anyone interested in the state of the law on corporate initiative
speech, determining the permissible scope of corporate electoral
speech regulation remains undone. Part III is an attempt to discern
the state of the law, coupled with an analysis of the dilemmas posed
by corporate influence on ballot measures and a prescription of how
to make the best sense of the relevant cases. Because Bellotti re-
mains the Court's most enduring decision on corporate speech in
ballot campaigns, the discussion below is framed in terms of the
three main pillars of Bellotti's reasoning. Examining the fundamen-
tal bases of the Bellotti Court's reasoning provides a useful way of
assessing the continued validity of the decision and helps to contex-
tualize post-Bellotti developments in politics and doctrine.
The earlier summary of Bellotti identified three main pillars to
the Court's reasoning. The first was conceptual; the Court reasoned
that the state had a compelling interest in preventing corruption of
the political process, but found that Massachusetts' law did not aim
to prevent the proper type of corruption. The second pillar was evi-
dentiary; the Court found that there was no evidence in the record of
corporations dominating or even significantly influencing the out-
come of initiative campaigns. Absent such evidence, the state's be-
lief that corporate initiative speech needed to be restrained was mere
conjecture. The third pillar was theoretical; the Court posited an un-
derstanding of the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment that
rested on the rights of listeners of corporate speech. The perspectives
of corporations add to the information available to the public, and
therefore warrant constitutional protection.
Twenty years after Bellotti was handed down, it is necessary to
analyze each of its three pillars to determine if they continue to pro-
vide sound support for the Court's conclusion that corporate initia-
tive speech deserves to be secured by the First Amendment.
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Furthermore, the resolution of the Montana dispute will likely turn
on these three aspects of Bellotti's reasoning and how they have been
construed, clarified, strengthened, or contradicted by later cases and
political developments.
A. Corruption as Contested Concept: From Quid Pro Quo to Other
People's Money
The courts have consistently held that states have a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, which in-
cludes preventing corruption. Yet exactly what the courts have meant
by "corruption" has shifted and evolved. This section, traces how the
concept of corruption used to judge the Massachusetts law in Bellotti
has been transformed by subsequent cases and political develop-
ments. With regard to its conceptualization of corruption, the Court
has unambiguously moved beyond Bellotti, but the precise contours
of the new conceptualization remain unclear and subject to debate.
The prevailing view among scholars and Justices is that the "New
Corruption" is designed to insure equality in the political process.
Yet, this dominant understanding of the "New Corruption" is incor-
rect; we can make the most sense of post-Bellotti developments by
understanding the new conception of corruption to be based instead
on the inappropriate use of shareholders' money in electoral politics
by corporate managers.
1. Quidpro quos, independent expenditures, and ballot campaigns
The Bellotti Court centered its discussion on the version of cor-
ruption articulated first in the seminal campaign finance case of
Buckley v. Valeo.7 4 According to Buckley, corruption occurs when a
candidate owes political debts to those who have backed the candi-
date with financial support.75 Due to such backing, a candidate may
come to feel as if his votes on legislation must follow his supporters'
interests, rather than the candidate's exercise of independent judg-
ment. Perhaps the best articulation of this conception of corruption
74. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
75. See id. at 45.
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was offered in Federal Election Commission v. National Conserva-
tive Political Action Committee:76 "Corruption is a subversion of the
political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to
their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to them-
selves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political fa-
vors." 77 To the Bellotti Justices, this financial quidpro quo version
of corruption was not applicable to corporate expenditures on ballot
campaigns. Since no candidates are involved, expenditures on ballot
measures pose no threat of improperly influencing the votes of public
officials.
78
If the courts adopt Bellotti's view that the only type of corrup-
tion subject to governmental regulation is the financial quidpro quo
kind, there is little chance the Montana restrictions on corporate ex-
penditures will survive constitutional scrutiny. Although the Mon-
tana law does not mirror the Massachusetts law invalidated in Bel-
lotti, to the extent it can be supported only by reference to quid pro
quo corruption, the statements in Bellotti and other cases that ballot
measures cannot be subject to this type of corruption will likely hold
sway. That is not to say that the courts have no discretion. While
unlikely, they could rule that Bellotti was wrong about the corrupting
force of corporate initiative expenditures on candidates-that, in-
deed, initiative expenditures can threaten financial quidpro quo cor-
ruption of public officials.
How can spending on ballot measures corrupt candidates? With
the growth in popularity of the initiative mechanism over the past
two decades, it is increasingly common for political candidates or of-
fice-holders to sponsor ballot measures or to make initiatives central
themes in their campaigns. Californians, for example, have wit-
nessed several high-profile candidacies in which initiatives have been
prominent parts of campaigns for public office. Governor Pete Wil-
son made the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 the centerpiece of his
successful 1994 re-election campaign; the anti-affirmative action
76. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
77. Id. at 497.
78. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790; see also Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1981) (no threat of corruption from
expenditures designed to influence ballot measures).
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Proposition 209 played a similar role in his aborted bid for President.
Dan Lungren, California's Attorney General, spearheaded the drive
to defeat Proposition 215, which legalized the medical use and pos-
session of marijuana. His effort was widely seen as the start to his
bid for the California Governor's office in the 1998 election. In the
Houston anti-affirmative action initiative of 1997, Mayor Bob Lanier
played an active role in the campaign to oppose passage of the initia-
tive, appearing in commercials and making public appearances. 79 In
the era of the initiative, politicians are willing to tie their political ca-
reers to ballot measures they think will engender popular support.
80
Part of this linkage is the candidates' efforts to define them-
selves vis-a'-vis hot button issues. Another aspect is the attempt by
candidates to ride the "coat-tails" 81 of initiatives that capture the
public mind and shape people's voting behavior. Sponsoring the
right initiative can lead to name recognition and can generate contri-
butions from initiative supporters.8 2 Because of this symbiotic rela-
tionship between candidates and ballot propositions, candidates who
have made a ballot measure a primary theme in their campaigns may
feel beholden to private groups that spend large sums advocating fa-
vored initiatives. If a candidacy is furthered by an initiative's suc-
cess, a candidate may find herself subject to the same political debt
arising from large direct contributions.
The threat of quidpro quo corruption arising from independent
expenditures of all types-in support of ballot measures or candida-
cies-may in some senses be even greater than that posed by direct
candidate contributions, particularly in light of contribution limits. If
a candidate is required to raise campaign funds in small increments-
such as the $1,000 limit for contributions to candidates for federal
79. See Sam H. Verhovek, Referendum in Houston Shows Complexity of
Preferences Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at Al.
80. See Jamin B. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judi-
cial Review of Popularly-Enacted Campaign Finance Reform, 1996 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 393, 408 (noting potential of ballot spending to threaten quid
pro quo corruption of candidates).
81. See John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the
Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence and Declining Voter Confidence Be
Found? 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 386 (1985).
82. See id. at 385-86.
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office 3 -she may perceive expensive independent advertising cam-
paigns more valuable than fund-raising efforts. Nor is it inconceiv-
able that a private group might make expenditures supporting a can-
didate in such proportions that the candidate feels a sense of
obligation to the needs of that group. As constitutional scholar Owen
Fiss has warned, "[a] candidate is likely to adopt policies that are es-
pecially responsive to the desires and interests of the persons who are
spending the money or who are in a position to spend the money to
further the candidacy. 84  The candidate might be strapped for
money, running against an incumbent with a sizable war chest, and
the advertising campaign of a private party might be enough to tip
the balance in favor of electoral victory. To the extent the candidacy
is linked to a ballot measure, such spending may advance his candi-
dacy.
Indeed, recent elections have witnessed remarkable growth in
independent groups taking out ads ostensibly to advance issues, but
often supporting or opposing candidates. 85 It is not inconceivable
that an independent group that wishes to help a candidate who has
linked his campaign to a ballot measure would view ballot adver-
tisements as a way of buying influence and access to the candidate.
The Supreme Court in Buckley rejected the argument that inde-
pendent expenditures posed a substantial risk of traditional, quidpro
quo corruption. "[S]uch independent expenditures may well provide
little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive,"8 6 the Court predicted. At least some recent
83. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (1997).
84. Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 2470, 2478
(1997).
85. Perhaps the bellwether change marked by the 1996 election cycle was
the sudden emergence of private groups taking out advertisements nominally to
advance political debate on issues, but really to express support of or opposi-
tion to candidates albeit indirectly. Issue advocacy advertising grew from a
trickle to over $262 million in 1996. Robert Dreyfuss, Harder Than Soft
Money, AM. PROSPECT, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 30. Among the most significant is-
sue advocacy campaigns designed to further candidacies was the notorious
AFL-CIO barrage of advertisements in key congressional races in 1996. It is
estimated that the organization spent approximately $35 million to fight against
Republican congressional representatives that the AFL-CIO considered vulner-
able. See id. at 31.
86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
November 1998]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:133
experience with independent issue advertisements suggests the Court
was right, although with the increasing importance of this type of ex-
penditure it is far from clear what the future holds.
As of today, candidates seem to dislike independent issue advo-
cacy expenditures, even when in support of their candidacies, be-
cause they cannot control the messages and may be held accountable
for them nonetheless. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the 1998
special congressional election in Santa Barbara, in which the race
between Democrat Lois Capps and Republican Tom Bordonaro was
remarkable mainly for the amount spent by independent groups on
issue advertisements. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent to
blanket the airwaves with advertisements in support of the candidates
by the Christian Coalition, a group favoring term limits, and abortion
rights and pro-life groups. 87 The Capps-Bordonaro race is likely a
sign of the future of electoral politics.
Yet, all of this independent spending did not necessarily help,
nor was it appreciated by, the candidates it was intended to support.
The National Republican Congressional Committee conducted a poll
on the effect of anti-abortion advertisements designed to help Mr.
Bordonaro and found that, after seeing the spots, 24% of viewers
were more likely to vote for Ms. Capps than prior to seeing them.
88
Only 19% of viewers said they were more likely to vote for Mr. Bor-
donaro.89 In a similar vein, heavy spending on issue advertisements
by the AFL-CIO in the 1996 congressional elections has been cited
by political strategists as one of the reasons Republicans retained
control of the House and Senate.90 Issue advocacy expenditures in
the context of candidate campaigns can easily backfire.
Although she won her seat in the House and might have been
helped by the issue advocacy (even that of her opponent), Rep. Capps
has stated that her experience with outside spending convinced her of
the need for campaign finance reform. "I don't know how much
87. See Todd Purdum, Interest Groups Run Own Race in California, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at A6 [hereinafter Purdum, Interest Groups]; Richard L.
Berke, Outside Help on Issues Raises G.O.P. Fears of Voter Backlash, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1998, at A19.
88. See Berke, supra note 87, at A19.
89. See id.
90. See id.
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[issue advocacy] interferes [with the campaign], but it is very frus-
trating for me," she said. "It's all something that we're going to have
to deal with."9' And Rep. Capps is not the only politician who dis-
likes independent issue advocacy. The main campaign finance pro-
posal currently under consideration by the House, the Shays-Meehan
bill, would effectively outlaw issue advocacy expenditures in excess
of $1,000.92 McCain-Feingold, the companion reform bill in the
Senate, would greatly expand the definition of express advocacy so
that more expenditures currently deemed issue advocacy would be
subject to regulatory limits.93 Politicians on both sides of the politi-
cal spectrum abhor political speech they cannot control.
In contrast, speech expenditures on ballot campaigns may be
more likely to threaten quid pro quo corruption than independent
spending intended to influence a candidate election. All spending in
support of or opposition to an initiative measure is "outside" spend-
ing. Unless candidates wish to deplete their own reelection war
chests, they are dependent upon the spending of outside sources if
they wish to see a ballot measure pass. While any particular advo-
cacy campaign might backfire in the same way as the pro-Bordonaro
abortion advertisements, initiative-sponsoring candidates have ,few
alternatives. Moreover, candidates can actively raise money for ini-
tiative expenditures from large contributors, such as corporations,
and coordinate the spending to best suit their campaigns. In this sce-
nario, the same threat of quidpro quo deals between candidates and
contributors posed by direct contributions arises from ballot spend-
ing.
Thus, it is possible that Bellotti was simply wrong in concluding
that ballot measure spending cannot corrupt candidates. Neverthe-
less, it remains unlikely that District Judge Lovell will take such a
route in deciding the Montana case. Trial judges are properly hesi-
tant to deem the Supreme Court plainly wrong on an issue, 9 4 even on
91. Purdum, supra note 87, at A6 (quoting Rep. Lois Capps).
92. See H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 254 (1997).
93. See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 406(b) (1997) (proposing to amend 2 U.S.C. §
431).
94. For a discussion of this and other pressures imposed on trial judges by
the institutional dynamics of the judiciary, see James Zagel & Adam Winkler,
The Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REv. 795 (1994).
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an empirical question where the circumstances have changed drasti-
cally since the initial decision. Although this departure from prece-
dent might be justified in light of these changed circumstances-the
growth of the initiative process, the increasing ties between candi-
dates and initiatives, and the development of issue advocacy-it is
safe to assume District Judge Lovell will not take this approach in
deciding the constitutionality of the Montana law. Indeed, he need
not involve himself at all with the quagmire of Bellotti's version of
corruption; the Supreme Court itself has paved a way out by adding a
new version of corruption to corporate electoral speech doctrine.
2. Austin, equality, and other people's money
The conceptual pillar of the Bellotti decision was rejected-or
perhaps supplemented-by the Supreme Court in Austin,95 where the
Court upheld a Michigan law limiting corporate political expendi-
tures in candidate elections based on a new conception of corrup-
tion.96 While the traditional version required the threat of quid pro
quo deal-making between legislators and financial contributors, Aus-
tin found a compelling state interest in preventing "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accu-
mulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas."
97
This novel definition of corruption has sparked considerable
controversy, in part because it has been misconstrued by both judges
and scholarly commentators. The prevailing wisdom is that Austin's
notion of corruption is designed to insure some measure of equality
of political influence in the electoral process. Justice Antonin Scalia
began his scathing dissent in Austin by sarcastically rephrasing what
he thought the majority opinion stood for:
"Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of elections
by preventing disproportionate expression of the views of
any powerful group, your Government has decided that the
following associations of persons shall be prohibited from
95. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
96. See id.
97. Id.
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speaking or writing in support of any candidate." In
permitting Michigan to make private corporations the first
object of this Orwellian announcement, the Court today en-
dorses the principle that too much speech is an evil that the
democratic majority can proscribe.
9 8
Later in his dissent, Justice Scalia insists that the "illiberal free-
speech principle of 'one man, one minute' 99 adopted by the majority
was soundly rejected fourteen years earlier in Buckley v. Valeo,
100
where the Court famously remarked that "the concept that govern-
ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."''
1 1
Academic commentators have similarly concluded that Austin's
conception of corruption is grounded in equality. Professor Dan
Lowenstein argues that the "primary rationale" of Austin is insuring
the "equality of inputs"' 02-i.e., "the idea that each person should
have an equal opportunity to influence the campaign debate."'1 3 Pro-
fessor Rick Hasen contends that Austin should be understood as
promoting equality of voice in the political system.10 4 Professors
Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein similarly view Austin as based on a
theory of equality, 10 5 as did the late Julian Eule.' °6
These analyses do not make the most sense out of Austin or pay
sufficient attention to the importance of the corporate structure to the
decision. The opinion itself insists that equality is not the guiding
force for the decision and emphasizes throughout its reasoning
instead a notion of corruption that I shall call "other people's money"
98. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
101. Id. at 48-49.
102. Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and
the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 381, 412 (1992).
103. Id. at 393.
104. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitar-
ian/Public Choice of Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L.
REv. 1, 41 (1996).
105. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 69 (1995).
106. See Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro
Broadcasting 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 108-11.
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corruption. Moreover, since those commentators authored their criti-
cisms, the Court has provided further support for the claim that Aus-
tin was about the illegitimate use of other people's money by corpo-
rate managers, not the equalization of political voices.
One reason to conclude that "equality of inputs" was not the ba-
sis of the Austin decision is that the Court emphatically declares that
the Michigan law "does not attempt to equalize the relative influence
of speakers on elections; rather it ensures that expenditures reflect
actual political support for the political ideas espoused by corpora-
tions." 107 Perhaps Austin's critics believe the Justices were being less
than forthright, trying to make their decision more palatable to the
reading public. Yet in light of the fact that popular opinion has, at
least since the Progressive Era, been decidedly against the corporate
influence in politics-and against the political misuse of shareholder
money in elections by corporate managersM-this seems like pro-
verbial "gilding the lilly."
A more profound reason to reject the equalization construction
of Austin is that the holding in no way leads to a state of equality
with regard to the corporate voice in politics. Corporations remain a
prevalent influence on politics, due to non-electoral political speech,
lobbying, and cultural influence through the economic market. If
Michigan's law was designed to equalize political voices by restrict-
ing corporate candidate endorsements, it was hopelessly (and proba-
bly unconstitutionally) too narrow. It is hard to imagine that Michi-
gan's law has (or could have) made much of a dent in corporate
political influence.
Moreover, under Austin, different viewpoints can be supported
by different amounts of money, and different contributors can give
different amounts to PACs or segregated funds. If equality of inputs
were key, it would seem to require that there be only a single set
amount contributors could give PACs or segregated funds (say
107. Id.
108. The Tillman Act, which banned corporate contributions to candidates,
was justified by its backers as a measure to prevent diversion of shareholder
money to politics by corporate managers. See 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905);
Hearings On Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential and Other
Campaigns Before the House Committee on the Election of the President, 59th
CONG., 1st Sess. 76 (1906) (remarks of Rep. Williams).
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$100). This would ensure that every $100,000 spent by a PAC or
segregated fund reflects the same amount of popular support as every
other $100,000 expenditure by another PAC. Instead, as a result of
the Court's holding, people can give within a range of amounts, from
one dollar up to the limits on the PAC contributions in federal or
state law. As a result, the $100,000 PAC x spends might represent
the popular support of 100 people (giving an average contribution of
$1,000), while the $100,000 PAC y spends might represent the
popular support of 10,000 people-giving an average donation of ten
dollars. Although this is allowed under the Austin reasoning, it is a
far cry from equality of inputs. Austin allows inequality of inputs so
long as corporate managers do not use shareholder money for politi-
cal speech in elections.
10 9
Threaded throughout the Austin decision, as well as earlier Su-
preme Court decisions, 11° is a strong guiding concern with inappro-
priate use of other people's money. In Austin that concern is voiced
repeatedly, often in terms of corporate wealth not being "an indica-
tion of popular support"' for the corporation's political views.
1 12
When phrasing Michigan's asserted compelling interest, the Court
cites "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth' ""3 but immediately adds "and that have little or no correla-
tion to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."
114
There are two ways of interpreting the Court's emphasis on corporate
wealth lacking public support for the corporation's political ideas. It
could refer to either customers of the corporation or its shareholders.
After all, the wealth in a corporate treasury is obtained from both
sources. Shareholders provide the capital, but customers supply the
109. For a discussion of how Austin's conception of corruption might affect
the administration of corporate PACs, see infra notes 340-51 and accompany-
ing text.
110. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990); see also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986); National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at
496-97.
111. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258).
112. See id.
113. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
November 1998]
158 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:133
income. In both cases, the money is transferred to the corporation
with no intent to support corporate electoral politics.
If we look closely at the Austin Court's language, however, it
becomes clear that only shareholder money satisfies the Court's defi-
nition of corruption. Here's how the Court phrased it in its most pre-
cise form:
Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption
in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no cor-
relation to the public's support for the corporation's politi-
cal ideas.
115
To determine whether the deployment of corporate wealth is cor-
rupting, the Court suggests that two requirements must be met: (1)
the wealth must be accumulated with the help of the corporate form;
and (2) must have little or no correlation to public support. Cus-
tomer money does not meet the first requirement because it is not ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form. Customers of a busi-
ness often do not know whether they are dealing with corporation,
partnership, or sole proprietorship. Indeed, the business association's
form is irrelevant to its ability to attract customers and sell services
or products. The money a corporation makes from customers owes
nothing to the corporate form.
In contrast, the money a corporation has from shareholders
owes everything to the corporate form. Shareholders are attracted to
investing in corporations because of their special characteristics of
limited liability and favorable tax treatment. And shareholder in-
vestment does not reflect political support for the corporation's po-
litical ideas. Indeed, if we take Austin's phrasing seriously, it is only
the deployment of shareholder money that can be the basis of
corruption; no other types of corporate wealth meet both of Austin's
requirements.
Such an interpretation also makes the most sense of the
Court's emphasis on the unique state-conferred advantages corpora-
tions have in raising capital. As the Court explains:
115. Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added).
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[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages-
such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of as-
sets-that enhance their ability to attract capital and to
deploy their resources in ways that maximize the re-
turn on their shareholders' investments."
16
These attributes of the corporate form are relevant only to sharehold-
ers, and not at all to customers of the business. Thus, when the Court
speaks of corporate wealth lacking a connection to public support,
the "public" the Court is speaking of is not customers, but sharehold-
ers.
Not only does the Austin Court repeatedly emphasized that its
conception of corruption arises from corporate expenditures that do
not reflect public support, the Court's reasoning throughout the
opinion rests on the concern for "other people's money" corruption.
We can detect this concern, for instance, in the Court's analysis of
the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's claim that the Michigan ban
is over-inclusive to the extent the law applies to a non-profit organi-
zation such as itself.117 The basis for the Chamber's contention was
that, as a non-profit organization, it was more akin to a non-profit
advocacy corporation, such as Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
whose general treasury fund electoral expenditures the Court found
protected in MCFL. Rejecting this claim, the Austin Court explained
that, unlike the Massachusetts organization whose "narrow political
focus . . . 'ensure[d] that [its] political resources reflect[ed] political
support,,118 the Chamber had a diversity of "nonpolitical""' 9 "varied
purposes,' 120 such as providing group insurance, sponsoring outreach
programs to encourage investment, and other "politically neutral"
objectives. 12 ' Consequently, financial support from its associated
members did not manifest ideological support for the Chamber's
116. Id. at 658-59.
117. See id. at 661-65.
118. Id. at 662 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).
119. Id. at663.
120. Id. at 662.
121. Id. at 662-63.
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political activities. 122  The Court then explicitly analogized the
Chamber's members to shareholders of a business corporation.
The Court further distinguished the Chamber from the Massa-
chusetts organization by looking at the disincentives members have
from dropping out if they object to its electoral politics. Like a busi-
ness corporation's shareholders, the Chambers' members may be
"reluctant to withdraw as members even if they disagree with the
Chamber's political expression, because they wish to benefit from
the Chamber's nonpolitical programs and to establish contacts with
other members of the business community."' 23  This disincentive
only matters if we recognize that some members join for nonpolitical
purposes and that expending members' financial contributions for
politics is in some sense abusive. Only by understanding Austin's
corruption rationale to be the misuse of "other people's money" does
the Court's focus on members' disincentives for quitting make any
sense.
We can further detect "other people's money" corruption in the
Court's finding that the Michigan law was not under-inclusive for
failing to include labor unions within its ambit. "[L]abor unions dif-
fer from corporations in that union members who disagree with a
union's political activities"'124 have a constitutionally protected right
to "decline to contribute to those activities, while continuing to enjoy
the benefits derived from the union[ ....,,125 "As a result, the funds
available for a union's political activities more accurately reflect
members' support for the organization's political views than does a
122. This part of the Court's opinion could support a view of the Chamber's
members as akin to customers of a corporation, rather than shareholders. Like
customers of a business, Chamber's members purchase the services of the
Chamber. Because customers have no residual claim to the Chamber's assets
(as shareholders of a corporation do), a concem for customers would not re-
flect other people's money corruption. Whatever the merit of this argument,
the Court itself analogizes the Chamber's members not to customers but to
shareholders. See id. at 652 ("[W]e are persuaded that the Chamber's mem-
bers are more similar to shareholders of a business corporation than to the
members of MCFL.").
123. Id. at 663. Of course, customers would have no such disincentive.
124. Id. at 665.
125. Id. at 665-66. The constitutional right of union members to refuse to
provide financial support for the union's political activities was established in
Aboodv. Detroit Bd. Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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corporation's general treasury."'126 In other words, because union
members can opt out, union expenditures are not corrupt in the sense
of inappropriately converting members' money for political causes.
Again, this distinction between union members and corporate share-
holders only matters if we understand the Court's definition of "cor-
ruption" to be the misuse of "other people's money."
Finally, "other people's money" corruption can be seen as the
basis of the Austin Court's acceptance of the Michigan law's exemp-
tion for media corporations. 127 If applied to media corporations, the
Court explains, the law might be interpreted to apply to "election-
related news stories and editorials."' 1 8 Yet, the shareholders of me-
dia corporations fully expect those corporations to publish such ma-
terial; indeed, that is an essential part of their purpose and value. As
the Court states, "media corporations differ significantly from other
corporations in that their resources are devoted to the collection of
information and its dissemination to the public."'1 9 The law is not
under-inclusive for exempting media organizations because those
corporations do not misuse shareholder money in fulfilling their
communicative goals. If Austin were concerned strictly with equality
or immense aggregations of wealth, media corporations (which are
often large and capable of exerting a forceful influence in electoral
politics) would not be entitled to an exemption. It is a fair reading of
the Court's analysis here to conclude that the Court is concerned with
"other people's money" corruption.
The notion that it is wrong to spend other people's money to
fund election speech is not created from whole cloth by the Austin
majority. Indeed, it was the central tenet of MCFL, where the Court
held that section 441b of the FECA was unconstitutional as applied
to a non-profit advocacy corporation whose general treasury funds
were an accurate reflection of the organization's "popularity in the
126. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666.
127. For an insightful argument that media corporations should not be ex-
empt from restrictions on corporate participation in electoral activity, see Rich-
ard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
128. Austin, 494 U.S. at 668.
129. Id. at 667.
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political marketplace."' 130 Long before MCFL, the Buckley Court re-
ferred to this same concern. In rejecting the FECA provision that
imposed ceilings on the amounts candidates could spend in running
their campaigns, the Court reasoned: "There is nothing invidious,
improper, or unhealthy in permitting" contributions from supporters
to be spent "to carry the candidate's message to the electorate."'
131
When the money used to fund political speech comes from support-
ers of the political agenda, there is no corruption threatened by the
expenditures. If, however, other people's money is collected for an-
other purpose, such as economic investment, it is a form of corrup-
tion to spend it on electoral speech that they may not support.
The Michigan law did not simply outlaw corporate speech for
candidates, it required that speech to be financed by segregated
funds, instead of general treasury funds. 132 If the business corpora-
tion raises money through a PAC, there were no limits on the amount
of speech the corporation could finance. 133 The Michigan law was
legitimate, according to the Court, because "it ensures that expendi-
tures [through segregated funds or PACs] reflect actual public sup-
port for the political ideas espoused by corporations."' 134 The accu-
mulation of wealth in these separate funds is still enabled by the
corporate form. It is only due to that form that the organization has
potentially tens of thousands of shareholders from whom it can raise
money.
A recent decision of the Court further supports the conclusion
that Austin stands not for equality but for a conception of corruption
based on the improper use of other people's money. In Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 35 the FEC brought suit against the Colorado Republican
Party for violating the FECA's party expenditure provision, which
limited the amount parties could spend in Senate races to the greater
of $20,000 or two cents for every voter of age in the state. 136 In
130. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259.
131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56.
132. Austin, 494 U.S. at 654.
133. Id. at 652.
134. Id.
135. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
136. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(1994).
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defense, the Colorado Republican Party challenged the constitution-
ality of the party expenditure limits, arguing that the expenditures
should be treated like ordinary independent expenditures because
they were not coordinated with any candidate.' 37 Siding with the
party, the Court held the party expenditure limits unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.
138
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for a controlling plurality of
Justices, reasoned that the uncoordinated spending of a political party
"reflects its members' view about the philosophical and governmen-
tal matters that bind them together," hence there was nothing invidi-
ous or corrupting about such expenditures.
39
This reasoning reflects the distinction made in Austin and MCFL
between business corporations and non-profit advocacy corporations.
Due to the fact that people join non-profit advocacy organizations to
support their political vision, general treasury funds reflect those
members' political and ideological views. In contrast, shareholders
do not invest in business corporations to support corporate politics,
but to pursue economic gain. While the Court in Colorado Republi-
can Federal Campaign Committee makes a controversial holding
that party spending is not inherently coordinated with candidates,
the Court appropriately viewed political parties as more akin to
non-profit advocacy groups than business corporations. People join
parties and give them financial support specifically to promote shared
political opinions or common allegiances. Political speech in support
of those shared commitments financed with their money-given spe-
cifically for that purpose-raises no threat of "other people's money"
corruption.
Nevertheless, if the prevailing "equality" view of Austin were
correct, political parties should be subject to the same regulation as
business corporations. Each of the two major parties spends more
than any other organization on influencing electoral outcomes, and
each owes its financial ability to special, state-conferred advantages.
For example, each of the two major parties receives an enormous
amount of financing for its presidential campaigns, freeing up
137. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 612.
138. See id. at 613.
139. Id. at 615.
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resources for other use. Candidates vying for the parties' nomination
can qualify for up to $30 million in matching funds; 140 each party re-
ceives $4 million to stage a national convention; 141 and the official
presidential nominee of each party is given $60 million to run his
campaign.142 If inequality from immense aggregations of wealth
gained through state-conferred advantages were the evil Austin's ver-
sion of corruption was designed to combat, then independent party
spending should be subject to regulation. Colorado Republican Fed-
eral Campaign Committee supports the principle that corruption does
not come from inequality of inputs, but must come from something
else. That "something else," Austin tells us, is political conversion of
other people's money.
The majority opinions of MCFL and Austin left unanswered the
question of why shareholders need protection from corporate manag-
ers if shareholders own the corporation. One reason stems from the
central problem of modem corporate law: the separation of
ownership and control in the large public enterprise. As famously
explained by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property, 143 shareholders are the owners of the
modem corporation, but management exercises nearly unfettered
control over the corporation's assets. 144  Management's wide
140. See 26 U.S.C. § 9037 (1994) (payments to eligible candidates).
141. See id. § 9008(b)(1) (payments for presidential nominating conven-
tions).
142. See id. § 9006 (discussing payments to eligible candidates); FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION, THE FEC AND THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAws 4 (1996).
143. ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
144. The "separation thesis" has been criticized by corporate law scholars
who subscribe to the "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation. Contrac-
tual theorists contend that if particular actions of management are inefficient or
undesirable, shareholders will pay to include prohibitions in the manage-
ment/shareholder contract. Alternatively, the market will reflect the ineffi-
ciency in the share price and undermine management's secure control of the
corporation. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 105, at 25-27; FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-22 (1991); NICHOLAS WOLFSON, THE MODERN
CORPORATION 31-41, 45-55 (1984).
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discretion and its potential abuse, has since become the animating
dynamic of modem corporation law.
145
Concern over corporate political expenditures may be viewed as
a manifestation of this dynamic. When a "corporation" speaks, it is
not the owners of the corporation (shareholders) who do so, it is
those who exercise control of the corporation's assets (management).
Management, not shareholders, makes the determination of what to
say, where to say it, and how much to spend. 146  In terms of sub-
stance, corporate speech is really corporate management's speech.
Yet it is the shareholders who pay for it.
Even if corporate electoral speech is understood as a form of
managerial diversion of shareholder assets, however, the question
remains: Why do shareholders need the state to protect them?
Aren't they capable of protecting themselves?
In their dissents, Justices Scalia and Kennedy each argued that
protecting shareholders was unnecessary. According to Justice
Scalia, a shareholder can protect himself in two ways: (1) "persuade
a majority (or the requisite minority) of his fellow shareholders that
the action should not be taken,"'147 or (2) "sell his stock."'148 Justice
Kennedy agreed: shareholders "can seek change from within"'14 9 or
"cease to associate with the group"'150 (presumably by selling their
shares). In other words, shareholders can protect themselves either
through the normal operation of corporate democracy or through free
alienability of their shares.
If either of these methods adequately protect shareholders who
dissent from a corporation's electoral speech, state laws purporting to
protect shareholders would not be justifiable. Such laws could not be
the least restrictive means of protecting dissenting shareholders,
and thus the laws would succumb to strict scrutiny. But do these
145. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW xxiii (1986) ("Most of
corporate law is concerned with the array of substantive rules and procedural
devices that are aimed at controlling managerial slack and diversion while pre-
serving adequate discretion to carry out business operations efficiently.").
146. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 105, at 63-64.
147. Austin, 494 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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mechanisms work effectively to protect shareholders? There is rea-
son to doubt that they do.
Consider first the mechanisms of corporate democracy. Dis-
senting shareholders may conceivably challenge the electoral speech
expenditures of management through shareholder proposals or possi-
bly proxy contests, inviting shareholders to vote to approve or reject
management's actions. The problem for the dissenting shareholders
is that these means of controlling managerial behavior are ineffec-
tive.151 Many shareholders in a public company will be apathetic to
the corporation's political speech (and some will no doubt support
it).' 52 Such apathy is hard to overcome if there is little cost to the
shareholders from the managerial activity. Even if Microsoft spends
$10 million on an initiative, the financial effect on shareholders will
be insignificant in light of the enormity of the multi-billion dollar
corporation's annual expenditures.
Moreover, management will likely fight hard to retain the privi-
lege of making electoral expenditures. Principled managers might
value the ability to make electoral expenditures as a means of fur-
thering the interests of the corporation; less principled ones might
value it as informal compensation-securing them access to politi-
cians, with a potential pay-off in the managers' career future. In ei-
ther case, management will value the ability more than the majority
of shareholders will value the restraint. Even if shareholder voting
was an effective way to restrain managers generally, it would be inef-
fective in restraining managerial decisions to fund corporate political
speech in elections.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy might respond that even if share-
holder voting is ineffective, those shareholders who dissent from the
electoral speech of the corporation can always sell their shares on the
open market. To see the flaws in this reasoning, one must first un-
derstand how individuals actually invest in public corporations. Al-
though some investors keep a watchful eye on their stock portfolios
and are capable of executing a trade easily once corporate political
expenditures are discovered, most individuals who invest in public
151. Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual
Class Common Stock, 54 U. CmH. L. REV. 119, 136 (1987).
152. Cf id. at 134-35 (noting shareholder apathy).
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companies do so through intermediaries, such as mutual funds and
pension fumds. 153 Consequently, they may have much less control
over their shares than Justices Scalia and Kennedy imagine.
Take, for example, an employee whose money is invested in
Corporation X through his pension fund. If Corporation X funds
electoral speech with which the employee disagrees, the employee is
incapable of selling his shares and disassociating himself from the
speech. 154 He exercises virtually no control whatsoever over his pen-
sion plan; he may be able to withdraw altogether from the plan, but
there are often penalties for doing so. How is the pensioned em-
ployee who disagrees with the corporate speech to sell his shares?
The simple answer is that he cannot-at least not without substantial
injury.
Investors in mutual funds pay less to withdraw their money in
such a scenario, but they similarly exercise virtually no control over
their money once they have invested in a fund. At any given mo-
ment, individuals with mutual fund investments do not know in
which corporations their money is invested. Mutual fund managers
move investments around depending upon market conditions and
they do so without obtaining investor approval. Individuals can track
their mutual fund's daily success or failure, but they do not know
which corporations they own on a daily basis. Mutual fund investors,
like pension fund investors, cannot simply sell their shares if they
dislike a corporation's electoral speech.
For shareholders to be able to divest from business corporations
that make unwanted political expenditures in elections from general
treasury funds, the shareholders must be able to discover those politi-
cal expenditures. Yet, contrary to Justice Kennedy's belief that di-
vesting is an easy option, shareholders simply will not know when
the corporations in which they have invested make political expen-
ditures, much less make them to support causes they disagree with or
153. Indeed, over half of the equity held in American corporations is held by
institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance compa-
nies, foundations, and managed trust funds. See Allen D. Boyer, Activist
Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional Investment: Some Les-
sons From the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 977 (1993).
154. See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholder's Rights
Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 270 n.126 (1981).
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make them with general treasury funds as compared to PACs or seg-
regated funds. An investor in Florida will probably not know that
Corporation X is spending money in Montana to oppose a ballot ini-
tiative to require mandatory bottle deposits. Indeed, it is safe to as-
sume that shareholders will almost never know of the corporation's
initiative-related expenditures, unless they happen to live in the area
in which corporate-funded initiative advertising is directed. Even
then, the corporate money may be "hidden" in the pooled resources
of the interest group sponsoring the advertisements. Viewers of ad-
vertisements funded by "People for Better Democracy" or "Citizens
for Sound Environmental Policy" are in the dark as to which corpo-
rate entities are contributing to such campaigns. Moreover, even an
informed shareholder will not know whether the corporate spending
is financed through general treasury funds or segregated funds.
Even assuming shareholders could easily sell their shares, this
solution does not so much as solve the problem of dissenting
shareholders as ignore it. Shareholders are not warned in advance of
the corporation's political expenditures. Selling their shares is
something shareholders can do only after the expenditure has been
made and discovered. The danger the state seeks to prevent-corpo-
rate managers using other people's money for electoral causes they
disagree with-occurs when the money is spent. A shareholder can
sell his shares, but by then it is too late: he has already financially
supported the corporate speech with which he disagrees. Selling
shares may be a symbolic expression of disassociation, but it does
nothing to prevent the corruption the state fears.
Thus, neither the mechanisms of corporate democracy nor sell-
ing shares effectively protect shareholders from corporate managers
inappropriately spending shareholder money on electoral causes.
The means Justices Scalia and Kennedy view as available for share-
holders to protect themselves do not work as imagined. They may be
nice in theory, but in practice they are not capable of protecting dis-
senting shareholders.
One objection to laws protecting dissenting shareholders from
corporate political speech in ballot or candidate campaigns is that
they are underinclusive. They do not cover all of the instances in
which a corporation might spend shareholder money to advance
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political ends contrary to shareholder's desires. 155 For instance, they
do not apply to corporate political lobbying, on which corporations
often spend more money than they do on initiatives or candidate
campaigns, or to general political speech about issues of the day out-
side of elections.
One possible response is that electoral debates are different from
other types of political debates. Professor Frederick Schauer terms
this idea "electional exceptionalism ' 156 -the notion that the First
Amendment might apply differently to speech impediments in the
electoral arena. The Supreme Court gave voice to electional excep-
tionalism in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes, 157 where it upheld a public broadcaster's exclusion of a can-
didate from a televised election debate. Because "[d]eliberation on
the positions and qualifications of candidates is integral to our system
of government,"' 58 candidate debates were to be treated as an excep-
tional type of public television broadcasting in which viewpoint dis-
crimination was inappropriate. Academics, too, have argued that
elections warrant exceptional First Amendment treatment.159 The
special nature of elections is manifest in long-standing laws such as
the Tillman Act of 1907 (now recodified as the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act), which prohibits corporations and labor unions from
making direct contributions to candidates." 6 Although contributing
to candidates has been held to be a constitutionally protected act of
free speech and association,16 ' no one has seriously questioned the
constitutionality of the ban on corporate and labor union contribu-
tions. Voting is an act of unparalleled symbolic significance in a
155. This was one argument marshaled by Justice Powell in Bellotti. See
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793.
156. Frederick Schauer, Electional Exceptionalism and the First Amendment
1 (unpublished paper on file with author).
157. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
158. Id. at 1640.
159. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 104 (suggesting electoral speech in forms
of contributions should be channeled through a voucher system); C. Edwin
Baker, Campaign Finance Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1 (1998).
160. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1994).
161. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17-23.
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democracy,162 and although we allow interest groups and organiza-
tions to lobby legislatures and seek legal changes through the judici-
ary, only citizens have the right to vote in elections.
Professor Schauer argues that the conceptualization of electoral
speech as an "exception" to "normal" First Amendment principles is
itself erroneous.163 Throughout First Amendment doctrine, speech is
subject to different levels and forms of protection depending upon
the institutional context in which it occurs. "Almost all of the law of
contracts, warranties, labels, wills, deeds, trusts, fraud, and perjury,
as well as much of antitrust law, securities law, and consumer law, is
best seen as a regulation of speech in the literal sense of that word,
yet exists without even a glimmer of First Amendment scrutiny."'
164
To the objection that electoral speech is political speech, and
thus always entitled to the greatest First Amendment protection, Pro-
fessor Schauer points out that even political speech rules are "highly
institution-dependent." For instance, different forms of protection
attach to political speech by broadcasters, by government employees,
on government property, and in public schools. 65 Elections, too,
might be seen as requiring particular, distinct First Amendment rules.
"[P]olitical speech in the context of elections, like political speech in
the contexts of billboards, posters, signs in windows, schools, col-
leges, government employment, and so on, is just one of numerous
settings in which political speech occurs, and in which putative
regulations are measured by domain-specific, and context-specific
principles."'
' 66
There are other reasons we might have heightened concern for
shareholders in the context of elections, as compared to other areas of
corporate political activity such as lobbying or non-electoral speech.
In his Austin concurrence, Justice Brennan indicates one such reason.
Elections "lie at the heart of political debate. But just as speech in-
terests are at their zenith in this area, so too are the interests of un-
willing Chamber members and corporate shareholders forced to
162. On the symbolic meanings of voting, see Adam Winkler, Note, Expres-
sive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 367-78 (1993).
163. Schauer, supra note 156, at 5-11.
164. See id. at 7.
165. Id. at 9.
166. Id. at 10.
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subsidize that speech."' 67 The associational right of shareholders to
refrain from supporting the political agenda of corporate managers is
particularly acute in the electoral context.
Moreover, it defies logic to insist that laws such as Michigan's
are under-inclusive because they do not reach corporate political ac-
tivity-such as non-electoral political speech 16 8-that the Court has
previously held to be entitled to First Amendment protection.
Because the Court has found bans on non-electoral corporate politi-
cal speech unconstitutional, certainly a state law cannot be con-
demned on the ground that it failed to reach that political activity.
169
Even if the state's asserted interest might be furthered by reaching
constitutionally protected conduct, the failure to do so does not ren-
der the interest any less legitimate or sincere.
Some commentators have argued that protecting shareholders is
not the true interest behind restrictions such as Michigan's because
the laws are included in state election codes, rather than state corpo-
rations codes where shareholder protection laws are usually in-
cluded.170 This argument fails for three reasons. First, the location
of a law within the state statutory codes is completely irrelevant to
the law's constitutionality; it matters not if it is on page 5 or page 15.
More significantly, this argument fundamentally fails to com-
prehend the evil the state wishes to avoid: corruption of its electoral
process by the misuse of other people's money by corporate manag-
ers. If the restriction were in the corporations code, rather than the
elections code, all shareholders of Michigan corporations would be
protected, but Michigan's political process would not be. A restric-
tion on Michigan corporations would still allow non-Michigan cor-
porations to corrupt Michigan electoral politics because they would
not be bound by a rule applying solely to Michigan corporations.
7 1
167. Austin, 494 U.S. at 677 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
168. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(invalidating state prohibition on privately-owned utility's inclusion of political
inserts in billing envelopes).
169. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 678 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. See Lowenstein, supra note 102, at 408-09. Cf Fisch, supra note 8, at
598 n.69 (recognizing that corporate electoral speech restrictions are not found
in corporations law of state).
171. Lowenstein, supra note 102, at 408.
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To the extent corruption of electoral politics is the state's concern,
the state can only protect its elections by a restriction on all corpora-
tions seeking to influence its electoral mechanisms. We must recall
that the state interest is not the blanket protection of shareholders
from corporate managers; it is the protection of state electoral politics
from a particular type of corruption posed by corporate mangers
spending shareholder money. Hence, the restrictions' location in the
elections code, not the corporations code, does not undermine the
state's asserted interest, it is essential to it.
Thirdly, underlying the argument that any shareholder protection
law must be in the corporations code is the false belief that share-
holder protection is the exclusive province of the state that charters
the corporation. If this belief were true, then much of federal securi-
ties regulation would be unjustifiable. Few would doubt that many
provisions of federal securities law are based on the sincere desire to
protect shareholders from management abuse. Yet those laws apply
to corporations that are chartered by the states. Federal securities
laws make plain that it is not only the incorporating state that has a
legitimate interest in protecting shareholders.
Once we understand that the Austin conception of corruption is
the unauthorized political use by corporate managers of other peo-
ple's money in the electoral arena it becomes comprehensible why
the Austin Court did not feel it necessary to overrule Bellotti. The
latter case involved a complete prohibition on corporate speech on
certain topics. 72 Under Austin's reasoning, such a ban would still be
unconstitutional because on its face it covers methods of corporate
electoral speech that pose no risk of corruption, defined as the inap-
propriate use other people's money in electoral politics. Although
the reasoning of Bellotti and Austin is inconsistent, 173 the two cases
can be read to form a single consistent rule of law. If a state prohib-
its corporate initiative speech without differentiating the source of
funds, the law is unconstitutional under Bellotti. If, however, a state
allows unlimited corporate political speech in elections so long as the
172. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259 n.12.
173. Indeed, the reasoning is inconsistent, as Bellotti specifically rejected the
shareholder protection rationale. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-95. Austin,
however, accepts that rationale. See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying
text.
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financing is through segregated funds or PACs, its prohibition on the
corporation's use of general treasury funds is constitutional under
Austin.
One remaining question the courts will have to answer is
whether there is something distinct about initiative speech as com-
pared to independent expenditures in the context of candidate
elections that undermines the application of Austin's version of cor-
ruption to ballot spending.
Professor Richard Briffault, for one, argues that Austin is strictly
limited to candidate-related independent expenditures. 174 Because
Austin did not overrule Bellotti, Briffault argues that the Court has
"establish[ed] a sharp differentiation of campaign reform jurispru-
dence based on whether the election concerns candidates or initia-
tives.
'175
But there were ample reasons for the Austin Court to decline to
overrule Bellotti. Unlike Austin, Bellotti involved a complete ban on
corporate initiative spending. If, as Austin holds, the corruption
states can seek to prevent is the unauthorized use by corporate man-
agers of other people's money, then the Massachusetts law in Bellotti
remains unconstitutional. In contrast to Massachusetts law, the
Michigan law was upheld in Austin explicitly because "the Act [did]
not impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political
spending but permit[ted] corporations to make independent political
expenditures through separate segregated funds."
176
Moreover, the Massachusetts law included content-based prohi-
bitions on corporate initiative speech. For example, it banned corpo-
rate initiative speech on issues not "materially affecting" corporate
property. 177 It also dictated that certain taxation issues were by law
immaterial to corporate interests, even though any reasonable person
would conclude-as the corporate plaintiffs in Bellotti did-that
those tax issues were indeed material. 178  One should not
under-estimate the importance to the Bellotti Court of the content
174. See Richard Briffault, Ballot Propositions and Campaign Finance Re-
form, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 413,429-30 (1996).
175. Id. at430.
176. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added).
177. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768.
178. See id.
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discrimination in the Massachusetts law; Justice Powell's opinion re-
peatedly stresses that the content-discriminatory aspects of the law
render it clearly unconstitutional. 179 In sum, the law's content-based
restrictions and overbroad reach suggest that it was not intended to
protect dissenting shareholders, but to "silenc[e] corporations on
particular subjects."'
' 80
Nor does anything in Austin's reasoning indicate that "other
people's money" corruption is limited to candidate-oriented inde-
pendent expenditures.18' If the corruption is in the use of other peo-
ple's money to further electoral politics with which those people
might disagree, there is no difference between corporate expenditures
related to candidates and those related to ballot measures. The key
difference between Buckley corruption and Austin corruption is that
the former turns on the impact of funds on candidates, while the lat-
ter focuses on the source of funds used for electoral purposes. Be-
cause corporate expenditures on ballot measures financed through
general treasury funds are tainted in just the same way as candidate-
oriented expenditures, under Austin's conception of corruption both
should be treated as evils the state has a valid interest in preventing.
The Court has moved beyond Bellotti's conception of "corrup-
tion." The growth of independent issue advocacy expenditures has
made non-candidate spending a significant part of our political land-
scape. It would not be unreasonable now to conclude that this type
of spending on ballot measures threatens the traditional quidpro quo
corruption of politicians. Despite the link between politicians and
the increasingly important initiative process, it is unlikely that the
courts will conclude that the Bellotti Court was wrong in its earlier
statements about ballot spending having no corrupting influence
on politicians. Nevertheless, by adopting a second, additional
understanding of "corruption"-corporate managers' use of other
people's money to support politics those other people do not
179. Id. at 784-85, 793.
180. Id. at793.
181. In his Austin concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that there is a "vast
difference" between candidate elections and "debating public issues" as one
might do in a ballot campaign. Austin, 494 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). He did not specify what the difference was nor offer any explanation for
why such differences should lead to varying constitutional principles.
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necessarily support-the Supreme Court itself has moved the doc-
trine of corporate electoral speech regulation beyond Bellotti.
B. Pillar Two: Evidence of Corporate Dominance
Writing for the Court in Bellotti, Justice Powell rejected Massa-
chusetts' claim that the ban on corporate initiative spending was jus-
tified by the state's interest in preserving the integrity of the initiative
process. 182 Justice Powell did not dismiss the state's argument out-
of-hand nor find it improbable or pretextual. Rather, he wrote that
Massachusetts had not come to court with any evidence that corpo-
rate spending hurt voter confidence in the initiative process or other-
wise undermined the initiative process' integrity:
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and power-
ful and their views may drown out other points of view. If
appellee's arguments were supported by record or legisla-
tive findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently
to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating
rather than serving First Amendment interests, these argu-
ments would merit our consideration. But there has been no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda
in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the
confidence of the citizenry in government.
183
In the absence of evidence of corporate domination, the state's inter-
est was purely conjectural.
In this section, I assess what remains of the evidentiary pillar of
Bellotti and conclude that not much is left. Since Justice Powell's
opinion, numerous scholars have attempted to provide evidentiary
proof of corporate dominance in the initiative process. This section
reviews and critiques several such attempts. I then suggest that per-
haps the only way to comprehend the potential threat of corporate
dominance in the initiative process is to look to the general social
environment in which ballot campaigns take place: an environment
marked by lack of voter sophistication, image-oriented politics, and
corporate control over the mass media. Nevertheless, I conclude, the
182. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90.
183. Id. at 789-90 (citations omitted).
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evidentiary inquiry should no longer be focused on corporate domi-
nance. Rather, in light of Austin's "other people's money" concep-
tion of corruption, the relevant evidentiary question should be
whether a corporation's general treasury funded electoral speech has
unanimous shareholder approval.
1. Evidence of corporate dominance: proposals and misfires
Perhaps there was no evidence that would have satisfied the
Bellotti majority. It is conceivable that no matter what evidence
Massachusetts had compiled in legislative findings or in the trial
court record, the Court would have reached the same result for other
reasons, such as the Justices' view of "hearers' rights" necessitating
unfettered corporate political speech.184 Under this theory, the Court
pointed to the lack of evidence as a cover. Even with record evi-
dence of corporate influence in ballot campaigns, the Court would
have still invalidated the ban. 'Support for this theory can be found in
the language of Bellotti. "To be sure, corporate advertising may in-
fluence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the
fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to
suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent
no less than that which is unconvincing."' 185 If the Justices firmly
subscribed to this belief, then record evidence of a dominating corpo-
rate voice would probably not have mattered.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to take the Court at its word
when it states that record evidence of corporate dominance would
merit the Court's attention. Bellotti was written by Justice Powell,
who was known for including in opinions instructions for future liti-
gants and policy makers as to how they might shape their laws or
lawsuits to protect them from broad court rulings. For example, Jus-
tice Powell wrote the lead opinion in the seminal affirmative action
case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 186 striking
down a U.C. Davis medical school admissions quota for racial and
ethnic minorities. Scholars have recognized that his opinion was not
a condemnation of race-based affirmative action policies, but a subtle
184. See id. at 788-92.
185. Id. at 790 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684, 689 (1959)).
186. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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guide setting forth how an affirmative action program can be struc-
tured to pass constitutional muster. 187 Justice Powell described in
detail what was wrong with the University of California at Davis
Medical School's quota and also suggested that an affirmative action
program that gave preferential treatment to minorities as plus factors
to their application would be appropriate. 188 Ever since, affirmative
action programs in many public institutions have been structured
along the lines suggested by Justice Powell.
If we also understand Justice Powell's Bellotti opinion as a
"how-to-do-it" guide, then any state looking to regulate corporate
initiative speech would have to support its regulatory laws with hard
evidence of corporate dominance in the initiative process.
But what evidence would satisfy the Court? The language of the
opinion suggests that the Court was looking for evidence that corpo-
rations exerted "undue influence on the outcome of a referendum
vote,' 89 enjoyed a "relative voice" 190 that was "overwhelming,"' 9'
or at least "significant in influencing referenda."'192 The operative
words of these phrases--"undue" or "significant" influence and
"overwhelming" voice-are ambiguous and the opinion does not sort
them out with any clarity. Yet the language appears to require the
state to show that corporate speech can dictate the outcome of initia-
tive votes.
Presumably any test of corporate dominance must separate out
initiative campaigns in which business corporations make a con-
certed effort to sway the voters from those in which corporate par-
ticipation is absent or minor. It would not make sense for judges to
187. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and
Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7 passim (1979) (ex-
plaining Justice Powell's Bakke decision as a "how-to-do-it" handbook for
professional schools).
188. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18. I have elsewhere described how Justice
Powell's vision of affirmative action was colored by strong understandings of
institutional rules and structures, abstracted from the social environment in
which those institutions actually operate. See Adam Winkler, Sounds of Si-
lence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 923,
933-43 (1995).
189. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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look at the extent of the corporate speech in all the initiative cam-
paigns in a given state if corporations only involve themselves in
some campaigns. Such an approach would render an inaccurate pic-
ture of corporate influence. Corporate involvement varies depending
on the specifics of the initiative; indeed, many hotly-debated ballot
measures, such as those on affirmative action and immigration, are
often devoid of any substantial corporate speech. If one's goal is to
measure the strength of the corporate voice, it is essential that one
focus only on those ballot campaigns in which corporations have
made an effort to speak.
If states only had to show that corporate participation in initia-
tive campaigns can sway the electoral results, the evidentiary burden
would be easy to meet. One might start with rather simplistic com-
parisons of numbers: look at levels of voter support for an initiative
measure prior to the campaign season and compare those numbers
with the actual vote count. This method presumes that corporate
speech was prevalent in the campaign and that it supported the side
that was losing prior to the start of the campaign. Several commen-
tators have made such comparisons. As an example of corporate in-
fluence in referenda, Professor Allen Easley cites the 1976 Colorado
initiative to impose mandatory deposits on bottled and canned bever-
ages:
[I]nitial popular opinion polls taken six months before the
election showed proponents of mandatory deposits leading
by a better than three-to-one margin .... On the eve of
election the lead in opinion polls had shifted dramatically to
roughly two to one against the proponents .... By and
large, opposition financing was corporate generated. 
193
Other commentators offer similar assessments, citing for exam-
ple corporate political speech on the 1988 Massachusetts nuclear
power plant closing initiative, the 1990 California "Big Green" ini-
tiative designed to curtail the use of pesticides and chlorofluorcar-
bons, the 1990 Oregon recycling measure, the 1992 Massachusetts
recycling initiative, the 1992 Ohio toxic-labeling initiative, and the
193. Allen K. Easley, Buying Back the First Amendment: Regulation of
Disproportionate Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L.
REv. 675, 675 (1983).
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1994 Massachusetts initiative to curtail corporate spending in ballot
campaigns. 194 "Each of these ballot initiatives enjoyed wide popular
support early in the campaigns .... For example, the California Big
Green initiative had 'overwhelming' support two months before the
election. On election day, however, each initiative succumbed to
devastating defeats. None... earned much more than forty percent
of the popular vote .... 95
Similar analyses are common in the scholarly literature 96 Yet,
showing corporate influence on initiatives through simple compari-
sons of support levels before the campaign and on election day tells
us little. The problem is that voter support levels several months be-
fore an election are not necessarily deep or stable.'97 Generally, there
has been little or no public debate by either side of an initiative cam-
paign so long before the election. Thus respondents to survey polls
may be reacting primarily to the title of the initiative or the phrasing
of the surveyor. In a complex issue dealing with the environment
and/or nuclear power, respondents may have no sense of the impact
or cost of a particular initiative. Several months prior to an election,
their favorite newspaper has not taken a stand nor have they seen any
advertisements concerning the issues involved. Moreover, we do not
know if voters changed their minds because of corporate spending as
such, or if the corporate funded speech was substantively persuasive
arguing against the initiatives.
Another proposed method of showing corporate dominance is
illustrated by the Montana case. Although as of this writing the case
has not yet come to trial, leaving uncertain whether District Judge
Lovell will require the state to prove corporate dominance, a hint is
found in the district judge's opinion and order on the Montana
Chamber of Commerce's motion for summary judgment.198 District
194. See David R. Lagasee, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech,
Power and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1347, 1347 (1995).
195. Id. at 1348.
196. See., e.g., Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Kenneth D. Karpay, Corporate
Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. § 441b and the Superior Rights of Natural
Persons, 14 PAC. L.J. 209, 226-31 (1983).
197. See id. at 228.
198. See Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, CV 97-6-H-CCL
(D. Mont. Feb. 18, 1998) (order granting Part IV and denying counts I-V of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
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Judge Lovell examined the evidence Montana offered to support its
claim to have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the
initiative process, and he emphasized the evidence of corporate
dominance in his ruling.
The evidence Montana relied upon, and District Judge Lovell
accepted for purposes of summary judgment, was spending ratios in
four Montana initiative campaigns. 199 In each of those campaigns,
corporate entities vastly outspent their opponents. Illustrative of this
phenomenon was the relative spending on a 1990 Montana initiative
which would have imposed a tax on the sale of tobacco. According
to the court, the citizen's group promoting the initiative was able to
raise approximately $40,000, while the opposition raised $1.5 million
from sixteen large corporations including tobacco companies R.J.
Reynolds and Philip Morris. While the largest single donation to the
proponents campaign was approximately $12,000, the opposition had
a $600,000 contribution from Philip Morris, a $300,000 contribution
from R.J. Reynolds, and other six figure corporate contributions. All
told, the corporate opposition to the tobacco tax initiative spent 97%
of the total money expended by both sides on the measure.
200
District Judge Lovell also took note of several other Montana initia-
tives in which corporations funded upwards of 90% of all expendi-
tures.
20 1
Similar evidence of profound disparities in spending ratios can
be found in other initiatives around the country. In the 1990 "Big
Green" initiative campaign in California, a corporate-organized coa-
lition spent over $16 million to defeat the measure, while proponents
could muster only a little more than one-third of that amount.2 0 2 In a
Massachusetts initiative campaign on mandatory bottle deposits, cor-
porate-financed opponents outspent proponents by a ratio of nearly
thirty-five to one.203 In various state-wide initiatives concerning
199. See id. at 30-42. See also Raskin, supra note 80, at 397-98 (using
spending ratios to argue corporate dominance of the initiative process).
200. District Judge Lovell stated that "99.7% of all funds expended" on the
tobacco tax initiative were corporate generated. Id. at 32. In light of the num-
bers he himself alluded to, this appears to be a typographical or computational
error.
201. See id. at 33-35.
202. See Lagasse, supra note 194, at 1386-87.
203. See Easley, supra note 193, at 687.
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nuclear energy, the spending ratio between mainly corporate opposi-
tion and proponents ranged from two hundred to one in Montana, to
five to one in Colorado and to three to one in California.20 4 Business
interests in Missouri outspent proponents of a minimum wage in-
.20crease by an eight to one margin.205 Opponents of California's
Proposition 211, an initiative making it easier for shareholders to sue
companies whose stock fluctuates excessively, spent over $26 mil-
lion, compared with just over $6.5 million by the measure's back-
ers.206 When it comes down to money in initiative campaigns, corpo-
rate-funded speech far outpaces non-corporate speech time and time
again.
But does outspending opponents necessarily mean that corpora-
tions dominate the initiative process? In one sense, the answer de-
pends on whether the money is successfully spent. If the money is
wasted on poor advertisements or direct mail campaigns that send
literature to the wrong people, then the money will not translate into
electoral victory. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that dispropor-
tional corporate spending does not guarantee success in initiative
campaigns. Perhaps the most nuanced study of the impact of big
money on ballot measures, by Professor Dan Lowenstein, found that
disproportionate spending can exert a dominating influence on ballot
measures, but only in some circumstances.20 7 Professor Lowenstein
discovered that one-sided spending has little impact when attempting
to persuade people to vote in favor of an initiative.20 8 But when
spent to convince people to reject an initiative, disproportionate
money "has been almost invariably successful. 20 9 Professor John
204. See id. at 691-93.
205. See Stuart Silverstein, Tough Sell for Minimum Wage, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1996, at D4.
206. See Carl Ingram, Campaign Fight Nears Spending Record, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1996, atA3.
207. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Proposi-
tions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29
UCLA L. REV. 505, 511 (1982).
208. See id.
209. Id. For criticism of Lowenstein's methodology, see John R. Owens &
Larry L. Wade, Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions, 1924-
1984: Trends and Voting Effects, 39 WEST. POL. Q. 675, 682-87 (1986). For
different views of the impact of money on ballot propositions, compare
CRONIN, supra note 2 at 111 ("When corporations spend vast sums of money
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Schockley surveyed the available social scientific studies on the in-
fluence of money on initiatives and reached similar conclusions to
Professor Lowenstein.210
Even in the sophisticated studies, such as Professor Lowen-
stein's, it is hard to separate out the power of money from the sub-
stance of what is said in the speech funded by that money. Never-
theless, these studies suggest a disturbing trend of corporate veto
power in the initiative process. Such "dominance" fundamentally
undermines the people-enhancing purposes of direct democracy.
To fully comprehend the potential for corporate dominance, it is
worthwhile to look beyond the mere fact of corporate spending. By
looking to the broader social, political, and economic context of the
initiative process and its link to the mass media, we can see other
threats to the initiative process posed by corporations-from ma-
nipulating voters to censoring political debate.
2. The environment of initiatives
The evidentiary question posed by Bellotti inquired into the
ability of corporations to dominate initiatives by overwhelming the
public discourse. For both Justice Powell and the scholarly com-
mentators who have researched corporate spending on initiatives, the
animating metaphor of corporate power was "drowning out" other
voices. Corporations might exert dominance over public debate by
flooding the airwaves with their speech and, like a loudspeaker blar-
ing in a room, preventing opposing voices from being heard.
But "drowning out" has never been a particularly apt metaphor
for corporate involvement in initiative speech. After all, unlike the
loudspeaker, corporate speech does not prevent other voices from
being heard. Opposing groups can take out mass media advertise-
ments and send out direct-mail literature. Even if they lack the funds
to finance expensive mass media campaigns, they can make infor-
mation available through less expensive means, such as internet
to dominate discussion.., the voting public often hears only one side of an
issue. The advantages that opposition money in large quantities can buy can
rarely be overcome."), and CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCING, supra note 26 at 290-91, with Ronald J. Allen, The National Ini-
tiative Proposal. A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REv. 965, 1028 (1979)
(contending that one-sided spending has little impact).
210. See Schockley, supra note 81, at 393-94.
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postings, political brochures, and public speaking. Their voice is out
there and can be heard, no matter how much corporate-funded speech
there is. A voter just has to be willing to search it out.
In place of the drowning out metaphor, we might more closely
analogize corporate initiative speech to the books prominently dis-
played in the front section of a Barnes & Noble bookstore. While the
company carries many books, it sells this frontal display space to
publishers at premium rates. Publishers value this space because
they know that the books displayed here catch the shopper's eye and,
of course, are more likely to sell. The diligent reader looking for a
particular book may be able to find it back on the shelves-so long
as his tastes are mainstream-but those without the previous com-
mitment may not make it that far back into the store. As with prime
time television, the larger corporate players can afford the expense of
gaining privileged access to the public's attention.
Corporate initiative speech occupies a privileged position in the
sense that it can afford the prime display space of public political
discourse. Most information received by the voter comes from mass
media advertising-via television, radio, and the print media-di-
rect-mail marketing, newspapers and billboards. Each of these
methods of communication is expensive to utilize, and thus better
suited for those with large amounts of money. Corporations that can
use general treasury funds avoid the collective action problem of po-
litical fund-raising faced by other participants in the initiative proc-
ess. Thus, corporations can afford to advertise in prime time or dur-
ing high-profile television events when the audience is largest. Non-
corporate advertising makes its way onto the small screen, but often
during the off hours when the prices, and viewership, is lower.
Without reaching the same audience with the same repetition-mar-
keting research shows that swaying viewers depends on well-timed
repetition, not simply exposure2 1 1-poorly-funded groups are less
capable of getting their message across and responding to the oppo-
sition's claims. Corporations do not force anyone out of the political
debate, but they do take on a prominent voice because the system of
mass political communication favors those with the most cash.
211. See JOHN PHILIP JONES, How MUCH IS ENOUGH? GETTING THE MOST
FROM YOUR ADVERTISING DOLLAR 248 (1992).
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Voters, like shoppers, often only see what is in the prime display
space. They confront many initiative campaigns without the tradi-
tional safeguards of party cues. As political science research has
long shown, the lack of voter knowledge in candidate elections is
often overcome by party cues. 212 When I enter the voting booth, I
may know nothing about the stated political positions of the candi-
dates for Lieutenant Governor. I will see, however, that candidate x
is a Democrat while candidate y is a Republican and I will be in-
stantly familiar with the general political attitudes and positions of
the candidates. The science is hardly exact, but nevertheless I can
place the candidates on a rough political spectrum and vote accord-
ingly. With ballot measures, however, at least those unaffiliated with
any candidates, there are few party cues to help the voter. Conse-
quently, pre-election efforts to educate voters on initiatives are all the
more significant.213 And it is here that the side which can outspend
its opponents by fifty to one, thirty to one, or ten to one ratios can
take its greatest advantage.
The willingness of voters to base their electoral opinions on per-
ceptions and imagery214 exacerbates the problem. Mass media ad-
vertisements tend to encapsulate issues into often deceptive slogans
and catch-phrases, eschewing substantive examination.215 Viewers
in California have become accustomed to advertisements related to
litigation reform that picture packs of hungry, salivating wolves
roaming the woods while a voice-over ominously warns of the im-
pending attack by lawyers on innocent elderly victims. Such adver-
tisements make good theater and may even persuade many voters,
but they do not give the viewers much substantive political knowl-
edge.
216
212. The classic political science analysis of the importance of party identifi-
cation in shaping voting behavior is ANGUS CAMPELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN
VOTER (1960).
213. See Shockley, supra note 81, at 393-94.
214. On the apathy and lack of political sophistication of voters, see W.
RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS (1986).
215. There is no better example of this phenomenon than the Arthur Samish
"Drive the Hog from the Road" ballot campaign described in Lowenstein, su-
pra note 2, at 559.
216. This fits the pattern of the "commercialization of politics" described in
RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAvID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 94-
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There is good reason for campaign strategists to favor simplistic
television advertisements that focus on viewer perception instead of
viewer knowledge. It may be easier to convince voters to adopt a
particular image of a ballot measure than to change their substantive
political ideologies. 1 7 Richard Woodward, the political consultant
who orchestrated the opposition's campaign against California's
"Big Green" initiative, credited much of his success in defeating the
measure to merely changing its public name.218 In a heavy mass me-
dia drive, Woodward's team relabeled. the measure the "Hayden Ini-
tiative" after the famous, but widely disliked 60s radical-turned-
politician Tom Hayden.219 In a media environment favorable to brief
commercials and sloganeering over political substance, we are left
with a democracy of images.
One of the more remarkable illustrations of form over substance
in ballot measure campaigns is provided by the anti-affirmative ac-
tion initiatives of the past few years. In 1996, California voters
passed Proposition 209, the "Civil Rights Initiative," by a substantial
margin. 20 The measure's language was worded as a ban against
state-sponsored discrimination and "preferential treatment." Al-
though the objective of the measure was to outlaw race- and gender-
based affirmative action in state hiring, contracting and education,
the language evoked more abstract notions of civil rights reminiscent
of the 1960s. In 1997, Houston voters rejected an anti-affirmative
action initiative by a fifty-five to forty-five margin.221 In contrast to
the abstract language of the California initiative, the Houston meas-
ure was worded straight-forwardly as a ban on affirmative action in
municipal contracting and hiring. Analysts of the contrasting results
have concluded that "of all the factors, none was more important than
the wording change in the ballot."2 22 In ballot campaigns, perception
can overshadow substance merely by a turn of a phrase.
95 (1996).
217. See Lowenstein, supra note 207, at 569.
218. See Tom Furlong, Expensive ictory for Business, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1990, at Dl.
219. See id.
220. See Bill Stall, Outcomes on State Propositions Yield Paradoxes and
Contradictions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at A3.
221. See Verhovek, supra note 79, at Al.
222. Id.
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The susceptibility of voters to images in deciding how to vote
helps to create the environment in which corporate initiative speech
can be particularly effective. Corporations have the upper hand in
reaching potential voters due to their ability to fund expensive adver-
tising campaigns through their general treasury funds. Of course,
corporations are not alone in being able to finance such campaigns.
Wealthy individuals and unions have also been known to fund big
money efforts to pass or defeat ballot propositions, often over-
whelming their opponents.22 3  Organizations with large sums of
money, gained through means other than persuading potential donors
of the value of their political agenda, have a decided advantage in
mounting the expensive campaigns capable of swaying the electorate.
Concentration of ownership in the predominant mediums of
mass communication threatens another type of corporate danger in
public discourse: censorship. As a result of mergers, mass media fo-
rums are increasingly owned by a handful of large corporate con-
glomerates. Seven corporate giants control eighty-four percent of the
most-subscribed-to cable channels and all six of the broadcast net-
works.224  The Walt Disney Company owns Capital Cities/ABC,
which comprises the national television network, nearly a dozen local
affiliates, eleven major cable outlets such as ESPN and Lifetime
Television, and several publications.225 General Electric owns NBC,
which operates including major-market affiliates and eight cable sta-
tions, including two cable news channels (CNBC and MSNBC).
226
CBS owns not only a network, it also owns over a dozen local affili-
ates in major cities, 175 radio stations, and a handful of cable out-
lets.227 Time Warner owns a handful of the largest magazine publi-
cations in the country (Time, People, and Life among them) in
223. California's Proposition 226 is a recent example of unions vastly out-
spending their opponents to defeat a ballot initiative. Proposition 226 would
have required unions to obtain annual approval from union members to use
their dues to support political activities, and unions outspent proponents of the
measure by as much as ten to one. See Eric Bailey, Labor Upset Prop. 226 by
Focusing on Backers, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at Al.
224. See The Media Nation (Chart), THE NATION, June 8, 1998 at 23 [here-
inafter Media Nation].
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
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addition to the WB television network, CNN, Headline News Net-
work, WTBS, and several other major cable stations.228  Rupert
Murdoch's News Corporation is a global media powerhouse with lo-
cal affiliates reaching over 40 percent of U.S. households and addi-
tional major holdings in newspapers, magazines, book publishing,
and cable and satellite broadcasting.229 T.C.I. is perhaps the biggest
corporation in the mass media industry with interests in over ninety
cable networks and the largest cable franchise in America.23 ° Ameri-
cans' primary sources of political information-both news and ad-
vertising-are controlled by just a handful of corporate entities. If
the managers of these companies believe that certain initiatives will
hurt business, they could close their outlets to supporters.
While there have been no published reports of corporate censor-
ship of ballot measure advertisements, political speech is increas-
ingly at risk when communicated through corporate media conglom-
erates. CNN, owned originally by Ted Turner and presently by Time
Warner, is one of the most respected sources for news and informa-
tion throughout the world. It is also one of the prime offenders in
censoring advertisements that support political positions on proposed
laws that might injure the business corporation's bottom line. In
1995, CNN refused to air an advertisement opposing a telecommuni-
cations bill because the bill would help CNN's business.231 The tele-
communications bill, which eventually passed,232 made it easier for
corporate media mergers by allowing a single company to own the
major newspaper, television station, radio station, and cable company
in a given city. At the time Mr. Turner was negotiating the merger
with Time Warner, which would lead to sole ownership of mass me-
dia outlets in several cities. CNN justified the refusal to run the ad-
vertisement by contending it posed a "conflict of interest."234 In
1997, CNN dropped advertisements opposing a United Nation's
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See CNNRejects an Ad, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1995, at A26 [hereinafter
CNN Rejects an Ad].
232. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56.
233. See CNN Rejects an Ad, supra note 231, at A26.
234. Id.
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treaty on global warming which had run previously on the cable net-
work.235 Mr. Turner is a well-known environmentalist, causing some
to wonder if his personal political beliefs dictated the content of
political advertising on CNN.236 When political speech depends on
media conglomerates for dissemination, it better correspond to the
personal politics of corporate management, in addition to the corpo-
ration's bottom line.
CNN's refusal to run advertisements on global warming and on
the telecommunications bill represents some of the most brazen il-
lustrations of corporate censorship of oppositional political views.
Yet, there is no shortage of examples from other corporate conglom-
erates. In the spring of 1998, publisher HarperCollins, owned by
Murdoch's News Corporation, canceled publication of former Hong
Kong mayor Chris Patten's memoirs at the last minute. 217 Patten's
book made critical comments about Chinese leaders in Beijing,
prompting the News Corporation to drop the book out of fear of
hurting its business relationship with China.2 38 Out of similar con-
cers for corporate business, Murdoch dropped the BBC television
station from his Asia satellite services because Chinese officials dis-
liked the political content of its programming.
239
While CNN and the News Corporation have censored political
speech that threatened the corporate bottom line or offended the boss,
at least they allow political speech to air on their national television
networks. In contrast to CNN and Fox (owned by the News Corpo-
ration), the three major national networks currently refuse to run any
advertisements in support or opposition of political issues, -2 40 such as
those involved in an initiative campaign. Each of the "big three"
have established policies against issue advertising,24 1 although local
235. See Debbie Seaman, Hot Potatoes: It's a Safe Bet that any TV Station
Will Air Your Fab New Detergent Spot-But What if Your Client is Planned
Parenthood or a GayAction Group?, CREATIvITY, Dec. 1, 1997, at 32, 32.
236. See id.
237. See Johnnie L. Roberts, Rupert's Black Eye, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16,
1998, at 44, 44.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Seaman, supra note 235, at 32. The networks do accept advertising
for candidates. See id.
241. See id.
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affiliates can (and do) sell airtime to ballot campaigns.242 An AC
spokesperson stated, "We do not accept advocacy ads because we
believe that it is subject matter best handled by our news division,
which can provide a balanced look at the topic ... ,,243
If, however, Americans must depend on network news divisions
for their political information, we have reason to fear corporate inter-
ference here, too. In October, 1998, ABC News controversially de-
cided not to air a report produced by two of its top, award-winning
investigative journalists that raised questions about the hiring and
safety policies at parent Disney's Orlando theme parks. 2 " NBC has
been criticized on several occasions for allowing larger corporate in-
terests to dictate news programming. In one instance, an NBC news
story on defective bolts used in nuclear power plants, bridges, and
airplanes failed to mention that its parent General Electric used some
of those bolts in its own nuclear facilities.245 Even PBS is victim to
the corporate interests that provide it financial support. In 1995, the
Newshour paid scant attention to a price-fixing scandal involving
Archer Daniels Midland, which underwrites funding for the show.
246
So much for relying on the news divisions.
The diversity of business interests within a modem media con-
glomerate only increases the number of opportunities for "conflicts
of interest" censorship. If the decreasing diversity of ownership of
242. The networks allow local affiliates to run issue advertisements, but this
is hardly a reliable alternative. Just recently, for example, the Chicago affiliate
of ABC refused to broadcast a family planning commercial for Planned Par-
enthood even though the affiliate had earlier run pro-life political advertise-
ments. See id.
243. Id. One basis for the network's policy, according to the ABC spokes-
person, is that they do not open the airways for "companies that can afford to
spend money advertising their points of view." Id. Yet, lest we conclude that
the networks are following the reasoning of MCFL, it should be noted that they
do not accept issue advertisements no matter what the source of funding, be it
a PAC or a non-profit advocacy group. See Karla Peterson, Merger, They
Wrote, S.D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 7, 1997, at E3.
244. See Bill Carter, ABC Shelves Report on Parent Disney, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 15, 1998. The report was shelved despite ABC having earlier signed an
exclusive rights agreement with the authors of the book in which the charges
originated. Id.
245. See id.
246. See Jeff Cohen, Stories TVDoesn't Tell, THE NATION, June 8, 1998, at
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the main channels of public information were not worrisome enough,
each of these conglomerates is much more than a media empire.
They have significant holdings in real estate, utilities, 247 advertising
companies,248 manufacturing,2 49 telecommunications,
2 50 financing,251
transportation,252 sports franchises, 253 retail enterprises,254 and a host
of other industries and businesses. 255 The larger and more diversified
the conglomerate, the more likely any given initiative will impact it
and its business operations. This dilemma is exacerbated by strategic
corporate partnerships that join media conglomerates with other large
corporations. The Walt Disney Company, for example, has "corpo-
rate alliances"-joint marketing and exclusivity deals-with, among
others, McDonalds, General Motors, Coca-Cola, Kodak, and
247. See Media Nation, supra note 224, at 23.
248. See id.
249. G.E., for example, manufactures aircraft engines, appliances, light
bulbs and fixtures, industrial motors, medical equipment, electrical equipment,
and plastics. See id.
250. T.C.I. has substantial interests in telephone carriers and cellular and
paging services, while Time Warner has a stake in PageNet, the nation's larg-
est wireless paging and messaging provider. See id.; see also Elizabeth
Douglass & Anne Colby, Satellite Problem Cuts Service to 90% of Pagers,
L.A. TIMEs, May 20, 1998, at Al (noting that PageNet is the largest paging
service in the United States).
251. Through subsidiaries, including the GNA Group, G.E. provides car fi-
nancing, mortgage lending, and consumer and commercial financing. See Me-
dia Nation, supra note 224, at 23.
252. Among its many products, G.E. counts both diesel and electric trains.
See id.
253. Disney owns the Anaheim Mighty Ducks, a National Hockey League
(NHL) franchise, and the Anaheim Angels, a Major League Baseball (MLB)
team. Time Warner owns MLB's Atlanta Braves and the Atlanta Hawks, a
National Basketball Association (NBA) team. News Corp. and T.C.I. are both
major owners of the NBA's New York Knicks, the NHL's New York Rangers,
and the NHL's Los Angeles Kings. News Corp. also owns MLB's Los Ange-
les Dodgers. See id.
254. Combined, Disney and Time Warner own over 800 retail stores. See id.
As of publication, Viacom owns Blockbuster Video, the nation's largest video
rental chain. See id; see also Chris Woodyard & Dottie Enrico, Taco Bell
CEO Fast Forwards to Blockbuster, Video Chain Seeks Revival, USA TODAY,
June 4, 1997, at 3B.
255. See Media Nation, supra note 224, at 23.
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Ever-Ready.256 As the network of corporate connections grows,
there are even more "conflicts" to impinge on the news media.
Even in the absence of corporate chieftains issuing censorship
orders, relying on media conglomerates to provide diverse political
coverage remains a concern. Media independence within a corporate
conglomerate can still be undermined by subtle and indirect attitudes
of employees seeking to please their bosses and enhance the bottom
line. As media analyst Leo Bogart has remarked in the context of
news programming:
Few media overlords are so crude as to give direct orders to
kill or slant stories. They do not have to do that in order to
let it be known what their views are and where their inter-
ests lie. Almost imperceptible Pavlovian cues reinforce de-
sired behavior and inhibit what is unwelcome.
257
According to another media critic, the tendency exists "to avoid
getting yourself or your boss in trouble. So an adjective gets dropped,
a story skipped, a punch pulled. 258 When you have a corporate con-
glomerate as a boss, there may be a wide variety of political perspec-
tives to which you might seek to avoid giving voice. Moreover, me-
dia outlets must take care "not to offend other large financial
interests, especially those of big corporate advertisers" who might
"cancel ads when they feel the reporting reflects unfavorably on their
product or industry. ' 259 The effect of this self-censorship can be sig-
nificant. "Concentration in other industries may lead to market
power, oligopolistic pricing and restrictive trade practices. In the
media business, it can change the country's values, ideas and politics,
perhaps even the national character."
260
The development of mass media conglomerates poses new types
of threats to political debate. The Bellotti Court looked for evidence
256. These deals are not secret, but I am happy to admit I found out about
them from an "inside" source. My wife, Melissa Bomes, works in Disney's
Corporate Alliances Division.
257. Leo Bogart, What Does It All Mean?, MEDIA STUD. J., Spring-Summer
1996, at 15, 22.
258. Jonathan Alter, A Call for Chinese Walls: Why We Should Keep Jour-
nalists Out of the Magic Kingdom, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1995, at 31.
259. See Joseph Turow, Hidden Conflicts and Journalistic Norms: The
Case of Self Coverage, J. COMM., Spring 1994.
260. Bogart, supra note 257, at 15.
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of corporate domination in terms of an overwhelming voice that
drowns out its opposition. While large business corporations may
have the resources (and occasional willingness) to flood the airwaves
with political speech, the modem mass media conglomerate suggests
other ways in which they might overwhelm the initiative process.
Media corporations have proven capable of censoring political views
hostile to the corporate bottom line--"conflicts of interest"--both
through executive decision and the more subtle corporate environ-
ment. Whether this phenomenon leads to censorship in initiative
campaigns remains to be seen. But it is clear that the social and eco-
nomic environment of the modem mass media conglomerate creates
new ways for business corporations to exert a forceful influence on
public political debate.
3. Corporate dominance: an irrelevant question?
Many have tried to compile evidence that might satisfy courts
that corporations are capable of dominating the initiative process. To
the extent those efforts were based on Justice Powell's "drowning
out" metaphor, they were bound to fail. But if corporations cannot
"drown out" other voices, they can take advantage of the system of
mass communication to assume a privileged position in public dis-
course. This broader, contextual understanding of the electoral
communication environment suggests the ways in which corpora-
tions can threaten political debate.
Is it possible however that the evidentiary question posed by
Bellotti is no longer even necessary? One reason we might conclude
that proof of corporate dominance in the initiative process is
unnecessary is that the Austin Court did not look to evidence of cor-
porate dominance in candidate-oriented expenditures. 261 Presuma-
bly, if states could not regulate the voice of business corporations in
the initiative process absent evidentiary proof of corporate domi-
nance, then they could not regulate the corporate voice in other areas
of electoral politics without similar proof of corporate dominance
there. Nevertheless, the Austin Court upheld the Michigan limits on
261. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659
(1990).
BEYOND BELLOTTI
general treasury financing of corporate electoral speech without ever
asking the evidentiary question.
It was not oversight by the Austin majority; instead, it was the
result of the Court's conceptualization of corruption. Due to the
Court's reasoning that corporate corruption can arise from the inap-
propriate use of other people's money, the evidentiary issue of corpo-
rate dominance on the process as a whole is no longer essential. Cor-
ruption is viewed as the political conversion of shareholder money by
corporate managers, whether or not that speech drowns out other
voices. Thus, Austin not only shifted the conceptualization of cor-
ruption, it also eliminated Bellotti's evidentiary question.
Does this mean that there is no remaining evidentiary question to
ask in corporate initiative speech cases? If one follows the Austin
Court, the answer might be yes; like the Court, we can presume that
general treasury funds used for electoral purposes have been con-
verted. However, if one takes Austin's view of corruption seriously,
we may want to pose a question the Court did not: Can the corpora-
tion show that it has unanimous support from shareholders for its
electoral speech? If it can, and corruption stems from the misuse of
shareholders' money, it would be appropriate to allow an evidence-
based exemption from the general prohibition on general treasury
funding.263 A law narrowly tailored to meet the state's interest in
curbing other people's money corruption would seem to need an al-
lowance for shareholder consent.264
Such a requirement might also turn on the nature of the relevant
corporation. A closely-held corporation may be able to surmount the
difficulty associated with unanimous shareholder consent with ease;
a large publicly held corporation will have considerably more trouble
gaining unanimity. In practice, a consent-based exemption would
stop almost all large public corporations from using general treasury
funds to finance initiative speech. It is inconceivable that the Walt
Disney Company or General Motors would succeed in obtaining the
consent of each of their hundreds of thousands of shareholders to
support a ballot initiative campaign. Yet despite this practical
262. See id.
263. On the constitutionality of state laws requiring unanimous shareholder
consent for corporate political speech, see Brudney, supra note 154, at 255-64.
264. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792-95.
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difficulty facing the large public corporation, the exemption remains
necessary for the majority of business corporations, which are pri-
vately or closely held operations. This does not mean that laws
regulating the funding sources of the corporate voice should not ap-
ply at all to private or closely-held business corporations. It means
that all business corporations, large and small, should be given an
opportunity to provide evidence of unanimous shareholder consent.
C. Pillar Three: Corporate Speech in First Amendment Theory
The third pillar of Bellotti's reasoning was its theoretical under-
standing of corporate speech under the First Amendment. While
overturning the Massachusetts law, the Court purposely avoided
grounding its decision on any general free speech right belonging to
corporations, stating:
The court below framed the principal question in this case
as whether and to what extent corporations have First
Amendment rights. We believe that the court posed the
wrong question.... The proper question.., is not whether
corporations "have" First Amendment rights and, if so,
whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons.
Instead, the question must be whether [the law] abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to pro-
tect.
265
Perhaps the Court avoided ruling on the question of corporate
speech rights because it was an unusually thorny one. Corporations
are entities with no obvious standing to participate in a democratic
polity. Corporations cannot vote, and no court has ever questioned
long-standing laws prohibiting corporations from making direct
contributions to candidates, such as the Tillman Act of 1907266 and
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,67 despite Buckley's
holding that candidate contributions are protected speech. Political
philosophy has traditionally understood democratic self-governance
to be a right attaching to individuals or to the corporate entity of the
265. Id. at 775-76.
266. Tillman-Gillespie Resolution of 1907, Pub. Res. No. 8, 34 Stat. 823
(1906).
267. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994).
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"People," but not to business corporations. Yet corporations, like in-
dividuals, have an interest in the product of government. In some
forms of political participation, such as lobbying, corporations are
the most active democrats. 268  But whether or not corporations
should have particular constitutional rights has been an elusive ques-
tion throughout American history.
269
In this section, I examine the competing First Amendment theo-
ries that might justify corporate electoral speech rights or, con-
versely, their regulation. I question whether the theoretical under-
girding of Bellotti makes sense and expose some of its weaknesses. I
then assess the main theoretical competitor to Bellotti, the self-
realization theory of the First Amendment, concluding that this the-
ory is also flawed as an approach to corporate initiative speech.
However, the constitutive approach does appropriately refocus the
First Amendment inquiry towards the rights of the owners of the cor-
poration, the shareholders. Finally, borrowing principles supplied
by organizational dues cases, I propose to view MCFL and Austin as
reflective of a theoretical framework with different, yet established
roots in First Amendment jurisprudence. Viewing corporate
electoral speech from this theoretical angle captures the association
and speech interests of shareholders and reveals the First Amend-
ment values served by the Court's reasoning in MCFL and Austin.
1. Bellotti, hearers' rights, and constitutive speech theory
The Bellotti Court was cognizant of the individual basis of self-
government and, indeed, attempted to translate it into constitutional
protection for corporate initiative speech. The Court hinged its rea-
soning on the desirability and importance of the speech to
268. See WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE? 44 (1992).
269. One might trace the origin of corporate constitutional rights to Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1815), where the Court, led by
Chief Justice John Marshall, held a corporate charter was protected from state
revision by the Contracts Clause of Article I, § 10. Since then, application of
individual rights to corporate entities has been inconsistent. Compare, e.g.,
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (corporations
are "persons" for purposes of Equal Protection Clause), and Allgeyer v. Lou-
isiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (corporations have substantive due process right of
contract), with Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporations lack Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination).
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self-governing individuals, regardless of its source. The substance of
the regulated corporate speech "is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy . . . . The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not de-
pend upon the identity of its source." 270 Commentators have thus
appropriately remarked that Bellotti rests on a First Amendment the-
ory of hearers' rights, rather than speakers' rights.27' Corporate ini-
tiative speech is protected because it serves the listeners' ability to
govern themselves.
If the Justices believed that corporate speech rights should turn
on the rights of hearers, one might expect to find some consistent ap-
plication of the principle. In fact, the Court has invoked hearers'
rights in some corporate speech cases, while completely ignoring the
principle in others. In commercial speech cases such as Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
2 72
and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,273 the Court struck down
advertising restrictions on the grounds that consumers benefited from
the businesses' speech. But the Court paid scant attention to hearers'
rights in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
274
and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,275 where it invalidated
laws requiring private corporations to give access to third parties to
their modes of communication-i.e., bills and newspapers.
The Court's finding that unlimited corporate initiative speech
served hearers' rights rested on no articulated understanding of cor-
porations as institutions. Nevertheless, it made some sense as a re-
sponse to the over-broad Massachusetts law at issue in Bellotti. That
law amounted to a complete ban on corporate initiative speech, thus
one could reasonably conclude that it effectively silenced corpora-
tions' voices. But hearers' rights are not substantially diminished by
Austin-style regulations on corp orate financing of electoral speech,
which give ample room for corporations to participate in public
270. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
271. See Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Com-
ment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 1227, 1234-35 (1986).
272. 425 U.S. 748, 757, 763 (1976).
273. 517 U.S. 484, 495-500 (1996).
274. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
275. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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debate. In his Austin concurrence, Justice Brennan explains that, de-
spite the PAC/segregated fund requirement, the Michigan Chamber
of Commerce had remained an active participant in electoral poli-
tics.276 In the ten years during which the law challenged in Austin
was in effect, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce had established a
PAC, raised hundreds of thousands of dollars, and contributed to
candidates with those funds in every election cycle.277 Quoting from
the district court's finding below, Justice Brennan noted that "'the
record in this case amply demonstrates that the Chamber PAC fre-
quently makes independent expenditures to influence political elec-
tions, and those efforts have been tremendously successful in electing
Chamber PAC endorsed candidates.'
278
Even under Austin limits, political speech and influence will
continue to be skewed decidedly in favor of corporations and their
interests. Corporate officers and managers are among the wealthiest
groups in society, and there is no reason to believe they are going to
cease their efforts to influence politics (nor should they). To the ex-
tent they believe in a corporation's political agenda, they will con-
tribute to segregated corporate speech funds or PACs which finance
electoral speech without limit.
Regulated corporate electoral speech does not offend the instru-
mentalist values of free expression; yet, there are other theoretical
frameworks for understanding the First Amendment's guarantee. It
has often been argued that the freedom of speech is necessary be-
cause speech has a constitutive function, helping individuals to
develop character and hone their faculties for critical thought.279
Constitutive conceptions of free speech have been articulated by re-
nowned lawyers such as Justice Louis Brandeis (in his famous con-
currence in Whitney v. California 2 80), Professor C. Edwin Baker,
281
276. Austin, 494 U.S. at 676 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
277. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
278. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
279. See Winkler, supra note 162, at 339-40 (describing the constitutive the-
ory of free speech).
280. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[T]he final end of
the State [is] to make men free to develop their faculties.").
281. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-
69 (1989); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REv. 964, 990-1009 (1978).
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Professor Martin Redish, 282 and other notable legal scholars.28 3 Ac-
cording to this view, free speech is essential not merely for helping
sustain democratic self-governance, but because of the intrinsic value
of speech to the individual. Violating the First Amendment's guar-
antee of freedom of expression adversely affects the dignity interests
of individuals; it silences them and hinders their ability to develop
fully as human beings.
It is not at all obvious how a constitutive conception of free
speech can justify unrestrained corporate electoral speech.
28 4 Corpo-
rations have no dignity interest to preserve and no character to de-
velop. Nor do corporations participate in political debate to sharpen
their "faculties for critical thought." Indeed, the constitutive concep-
tion seems to be particularly dependent upon the human characteris-
tics of speakers: their dignity and rational faculties. This conclusion
is given some additional weight by the fact that constitutive theorist
C. Edwin Baker has strongly criticized the Supreme Court's Bellotti
decision and inveighed against extending free speech rights to corpo-
rate entities.
285
Baker and others have made their cases capably and there is no
need to repeat that effort here. Nonetheless, Professor Redish and
Howard Wasserman have recently published an important article ar-
guing in favor of corporate political speech rights on constitutive free
speech grounds that warrants discussion.
286
282. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
591,593 (1982).
283. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Indi-
vidual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 43-47 (1990); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:
Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62
(1975).
284. Justice Powell has been criticized for failing to consider whether a con-
stitutive understanding of free speech could justify corporate initiative spend-
ing protection. See Nicholson, supra note 44 at 606; Schneider, supra note
271, at 1235, 1257-61.
285. See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political
Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646,
646 (1982).
286. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General
Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998).
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Redish and Wasserman do not argue that business corporations
have faculties and characters in need of development, nor claim that
corporate enterprises have dignity rights to preserve. Rather, they
contend that corporate speech serves to further the constitutive inter-
ests of its founders and its shareholders. 287 "[T]he corporate form
performs an important democratic function in facilitating the per-
sonal self-realization of the individuals who have made the voluntary
choice to make use of it. One should view corporate speech, then, as
a form of indirect or catalytic self-realization... fully consistent with
the purposes served by the constitutional protection of speech."
288
Due to this "catalytic self-realization" value, corporate political
speech warrants full First Amendment protection, without any limi-
tation on funding sources.
There are four flaws in this argument. First, it is hardly clear
that corporate political speech serves any self-realization goals of the
individuals who have chosen to associate with the corporate entity.
Shareholders invest in business corporations to garner a profit and
grow their portfolio. The investment is a gamble, with more risk
than an investment in bonds or treasury bills and, the shareholder
hopes, more return. It is a commercial transaction at its core: the
shareholder gives up something of value (his dollar) in exchange for
something of value (a share of stock), with the traditional commer-
cial mindset that the trade will leave the shareholder better off than
before. For most if not all shareholders, business corporations are
not catalysts for self-realization, they are vehicles for profit-
maximization.
Second, even assuming that business associations "serve as
catalysts in enabling people to use and develop their human faculties
and control their own destinies by pursuing their chosen pur-
poses, ' 289 corporate speech does not necessarily achieve those ends.
It is essential to remember what Redish and Wasserman forget:
shareholders have little control over the use of their money once it is
invested. Corporate managers make the decisions on what political
issues to support, functionally immunized from shareholder scrutiny
287. See id. at 237.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 252.
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by the business judgment rule and the structure of corporate democ-
racy. 29  The consequence is that corporate political speech reflects
the judgments of corporate officers, and not necessarily the people
whose money funds the speech. If a business corporation's political
speech helps a shareholder to realize his sense of self, it is by chance
not design.
Third, even if some shareholders use the corporate form for self-
realization, allowing corporate political speech may have the effect
of diminishing or harming the character development of other share-
holders. To the extent the corporation uses a shareholder's money to
support political causes he disagrees with, the shareholder may end
up feeling abused and powerless. His own money has fought against
him in the electoral arena. Yet, helplessness and being taken advan-
tage of are hardly the character traits the Constitution was designed
to encourage through its First Amendment guarantee.
Fourth, it does not follow inexorably from the possibility of
catalytic self-realization that corporate speech should receive broad
constitutional protection. The law has never offered constitutional
support to any and all forms of speech within associations that might
conceivably further the self-realization of their members. Rather, it
has distinguished between associations based on their purpose and
context. A political advocacy association, such as a political party,
the NAACP, or the Christian Coalition, designed especially for the
expression of ideas and the influencing of public policy, receives the
constitutional freedoms of speech and association. Yet, an associa-
tion of people formed to commit crimes, as in a conspiracy or
the Mafia, cannot claim speech rights protection for their criminal
statements. Despite the fact that Mafia membership and criminal
speech might help constitute the members' personalities-they may
feel a sense of belonging, a place of power over others, and rebel-
liousness-speech in furtherance of the associations' unlawful goals
is not constitutionally protected.29' Indeed, it can be deemed an
"overt act" of their conspiracy and subject them to prison terms. The
290. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
291. Hence, the speech aspects of perjury, fraud, conspiracy, and bribery are
outlawed.
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law properly distinguishes among different sorts of associations de-
pending on their purposes and their context.
This last point indicates a larger problem associated with pro-
tecting speech on the basis of self-realization. Virtually any speech
can be conceived of as promoting the development of the speaker's
self, even speech that virtually all agree lacks First Amendment pro-
tection. Perjury, child pornography, deliberately false publication,
defamation, and the disclosure of military secrets to foreign spies
may all serve to enhance the speaker's personality or character. They
might do so in ways that we find objectionable and even disgusting,
but they still serve constitutive ends. Although I have elsewhere rec-
ognized the importance of constitutive theory, in particular with re-
gard to the right to vote,292 in the speech context constitutivity takes
us only so far. It does not adequately capture why we protect some
types of speech while limiting others.
Nevertheless, if we were determined to set up a system in which
corporate electoral speech would further the self-realization of those
who provide financial support for the speech, then Austin's rule
makes more sense than Bellotti's. If business corporations are
limited to speaking on electoral issues through segregated funds or
PACs, then only those who agree with the content of the speech will
fund it. Austin's rule simply allows people who have invested in the
business corporation for purely economic reasons-and who might
feel mistreated by electoral speech supported by their money with no
beneficial constitutive or developmental effects-to avoid being
taken advantage of, without sacrificing their economic objectives.
Those who might wish to realize their selves through the business
corporation's speech have ways to do so through the corporate PAC.
That seems like a system designed to enhance people's ability to
"control their own destinies by pursuing their chosen purposes."293
Redish and Wasserman are critical of Austin because, in their
view, it relies on hopelessly circular reasoning in requiring that busi-
ness corporations speak through segregated funds and PACs that re-
flect genuine political support. "[I]f such calibration were necessary,
[how could] the idea's popularity . . . be measured if the idea's
292. See Winkler, supra note 162, at 367-78.
293. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 286, at 252.
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expression were restricted beforehand[?] How, one might reasonably
ask, can an idea get itself accepted in the competition of the market if
the state can restrict the idea at the source... ?,,294
Whatever one might think of Austin, it does not restrict any
idea's expression "beforehand" or "at [its] source." Any perspective
the corporation wishes to espouse-or, to be clear, the corporation's
managers wish to espouse-can be expressed and given the opportu-
nity to gain political support. Funding of that speech must simply be
through segregated funds or PACs, from which it can gain unlimited
support. Any interested corporation burdened by a law similar to the
Michigan law upheld in Austin would set up a permanent segregated
fund or PAC for electoral expression, enabling it to further corporate
views in the political marketplace. Indeed, corporations we might
expect to be politically active already have well-established PACs to
support candidates. Even with limits on corporate electoral speech,
business corporations will remain a vibrant source of information.
For those who might realize themselves through corporate electoral
speech, contributing to PACs or segregated funds fully enables them
to accomplish that goal.
2. Free speech rights of corporate shareholders
One of the primary insights of First Amendment theories that
rest on self-realization is that the focus of First Amendment protec-
tion is on the shareholders, not the corporate entity as such. Share-
holders "own" the business corporation as well as the money in the
corporation's general treasury. Any First Amendment theory that
protects unlimited corporate electoral speech, no matter what its
source of funds, must justify why corporate managers can spend
shareholders' money to fund political speech in elections those
shareholders may not support.
By reference to long-standing principles of associational free-
dom and organizational speech, in particular those developed in un-
ion dues, state bar dues, and student fee cases, we can see the out-
lines of a First Amendment approach that refocuses Bellotti's
understanding of hearers' rights to Austin's view of shareholder
rights. It is not that organizational dues cases provide an exact or
294. Id. at 266 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
202
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precise analogy to corporate electoral speech (they do not); it is that
these cases suggest a First Amendment view of organizational poli-
tics that balances the rights of the organization against the rights of
its members.
In the context of the First Amendment, it has been held that in-
dividuals should not be forced to support political ideas they do not
believe. Although the relevant cases have arisen out of legal contro-
versies involving state action, judges and Justices have based their
reasoning on the maxim that coerced political speech, by its very
nature, offends First Amendment values. In West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette,295 the Supreme Court overturned a state law
requiring public school students to recite the pledge of allegiance on
this basis. "It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression
of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when
the expression presents a clear and present danger .... It would
seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even
more immediate and urgent grounds. ,,296 Forced political speech
is not protected speech.
While Barnette affirms the general principle that individuals
should not be made to support causes involuntarily, organizational
dues cases provide further insight into how First Amendment values
work in associational settings.2 97 In a series of cases, the courts have
held that political speech of organizations representing associations
of members joined for nonpolitical purposes (such as unions and
state bar associations) may offend the association and speech rights
of dissenting members. In each of these organizational settings,
members may decline to provide financial support for political
speech sponsored by the organization. 298 Although the organizations
may have speech rights themselves, they can be required to respect
the associational choices of their dissenting members by exempting
295. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
296. Id. at 633.
297. For an early, pre-Austin argument that corporate speech cases raise
similar issues as union dues cases, see Brudney, supra note 154, at 268-71.
298. Associational dues cases stand for the First Amendment tenet, aptly ar-
ticulated by Thomas Jefferson, that "'to compel a man to furnish contributions
of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical."' IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948).
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them from financing the organizations' political speech.299 Under
the First Amendment, dissenting members ought not be forced to re-
sign their membership, and forsake the nonpolitical benefits of it, if
they disapprove of the organization's political speech. Instead, asso-
ciational organizations such as unions, bar associations, universities
and now corporations, can be required to fund political speech in
ways designed to allow dissenting members to abstain from provid-
ing financial backing.
The Court began to develop this line of reasoning in union dues
cases. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,300 a group of
teachers required by state law to join the teachers' union or pay fees
to support the union's collective bargaining efforts challenged the
union's use of member and employee dues to support political
causes.301 While upholding the state law requiring the payment of
dues in a union shop, even by non-union members, the Court held
that the union violated the employees' First Amendment rights by
spending such payments to "contribute to political candidates and to
express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining
representative.,,30 Writing for the Court, Justice Potter Stewart
looked specifically to campaign finance case law for appropriate First
Amendment principles. "One of the principles underlying the
Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo was that contributing to an or-
ganization for the purpose of spreading a political message is pro-
tected by the First Amendment .... The fact that the [teachers] are
compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contribu-
tions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their
constitutional rights."
303
299. Where an association's speech is not political, but consists of generic
commercial advertising, the court has refused to allow dissenting members to
cease providing financial support for the speech. See Glickman v. Wileman
Bros., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1997).
300. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Prior to Abood, the Court held that, as a matter of
statutory construction, the Railway Labor Act did not allow unions to spend
compulsory dues intended for collective bargaining for political causes against
the will of employees. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 770 (1961).
301. SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 209.
302. Id. at 234.
303. Id. Another factor in the Court's analysis was that public employees
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In his Austin dissent, Justice Kennedy recognized that union
dues cases might be seen as somewhat analogous to corporate politi-
cal speech controversies and suggested that there was a "crucial dis-
tinction 3 °4 between shareholders and union members. That distinc-
tion was found in the fact that a shareholder can easily divest in a
corporation, but a union member cannot leave a union without incur-
ring significant costs. Unlike union members, shareholders who dis-
agree with the political views espoused by a corporation "can seek
change from within, withhold financial support, cease to associate
with the group, or form a rival group of their own.,
30 5
Of course, dissenting union members can also "seek change
from within" or "form a rival group of their own"f30 6 within the union
to dissuade the union's political pursuits. Nevertheless, Justice Ken-
nedy is right that the burden imposed on a shareholder to divest from
a corporate stock holding is considerably less than that faced by a
union member who might be forced to choose between supporting
the union's political causes or leave his job.
Yet Justice Kennedy's argument obscures important difficulties
faced by a shareholder who disagrees with a corporation's electoral
speech. When these are accounted for, the "crucial distinction" be-
tween union dues and shareholder money dissolves. First, explicit in
Justice Kennedy's argument is the belief that shareholders can easily
withdraw their money from the corporation in which they have
invested. As discussed earlier, most stock-holding individuals have
considerably less control over where their money is invested than
Justice Kennedy presumes.30 7 Investors in pension funds, in mutual
funds and in other intermediaries often lack knowledge of where
their money is on a given day. Even if they knew, they might be un-
able to exercise effective control over their investments. More
should not be compelled to forsake their First Amendment rights as a condition
of public employment. See id. at 234-36. In subsequent cases, however, the
Court made clear that the Abood principle applied with equal force to private
sector employees. See Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455-57 (1984).
304. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 709-10
(1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978)).
305. Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
307. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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importantly, a shareholder who sells her shares after discovering that
her corporation has funded political speech acts too late; she has al-
ready financed the speech. The damage has been done.
A union member may actually be better able to discover the use
of his dues than a shareholder because he works with other dues-
paying members in a union shop where information may spread eas-
ily. While no one would deny that the penalty to a union member
who must quit his job to avoid the unwanted political use of his dues
is greater than any faced by a dissenting shareholder, the latter faces
problems associated with limited control and limited knowledge that
make divestment an utterly ineffective remedy for unwanted corpo-
rate electoral spending. If the main difference, for purposes of the
First Amendment, between union dues and shareholder investments
is ease of divestment or the potential of corporate democratic con-
trol-as Justice Kennedy argues-then there is little to distinguish
them in practice.
Another objection to limiting the power of business corporations
to spend general treasury funds on electoral speech comes from those
who view any act of the corporation as a necessary part of profit-
making.3 °8 Under this view, corporate electoral speech is like corpo-
rate commercial advertising: each involves expenditures designed to
protect or increase the corporation's business. Corporate speech on
ballot initiatives is thus an essential aspect of the corporation's pur-
suit of profit and, so long as the expenditures can reasonably be char-
acterized as in the shareholders' best interests, such expenditures are
protected from judicial oversight by the business judgment rule.
First Amendment case law on union dues, however, suggests the
limits of such an argument within the framework of free speech. The
political speech funded by union dues is often, if not always, de-
signed to advance union objectives. Consequently, unions could
contend that political expenditures further the broad interests of un-
ion members, much the same as corporate electoral speech furthers
the economic interests of shareholders. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has held that political expenditures by unions, no matter how
much they further union objectives, can be regulated consistently
308. See generally Baker, supra note 285, at 652-55 (discussing the market-
based justification for corporate speech and arguing against it).
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with the First Amendment. 30 9 According to the Court, unions have
the ability to spend members' dues on "necessarily or reasonably in-
curred" expenses.310 Yet, those expenditures are defined narrowly to
include only those used for collective bargaining, dispute resolution,
and activities to implement the duties of the union as the employees'
exclusive representative. 311 Thus, to the extent the union spends
money to support pro-union political candidates or pro-union legisla-
tion, the members must be afforded the opportunity to withhold their
monetary support.312 Even where union dues will be used to further
union members' interests, the members have a First Amendment
right to refuse to contribute financially to the political expenditures.
The Court has extended this reasoning to non-union organiza-
tions such as state bar associations. Keller v. State Bar of California
is an illustration. In Keller, the Court held that the California State
Bar's use of attorney dues to finance political or ideological activities
with which some members disagreed violated the First Amendment
rights of dissenting attorney members. In pursuit of its broadly-
phrased, general mission of "promot[ing] 'the improvement of the
administration of justice, ' '3 13 the State Bar had made political ex-
penditures in diverse areas. The Bar made expenditures lobbying for
and against legislation, including a law which would prohibit state
employers from requiring employees to take polygraph tests, a law
creating an unlimited right of action to sue air polluters, a law creat-
ing criminal sanctions for selling drug paraphernalia to minors, and a
law providing for life imprisonment for some minors tried as adults
for murder.314 The Bar also made expenditures for adopting political
resolutions which, among other things, disapproved of statements of
a candidate for public office regarding a victim's bill of rights
and denounced federal legislation designed to limit federal court
309. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 446
U.S. 435, 457 (1984).
310. Seeid. at448.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 447.
313. Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1156, 767 P.2d 1020, 1021, 255
Cal. Rptr. 542, 543 (1989) [hereinafter ("Keller I")] (quoting CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6031(a) (West Supp. 1990)).
314. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 5-6 & n.2. (1990) ("Keller II").
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jurisdiction over specific social controversies."' Finally, the Bar
made expenditures for filing amicus briefs in cases involving: the
power of a workers' compensation board to discipline lawyers; the
mandatory client-list disclosure for attorneys who serve as public of-
ficials; and the disqualification of a law firm.
3 16
Borrowing from the union dues cases, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist reasoned that the constitutionality of the State Bar's ex-
penditures must turn on whether they were "necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or 'im-
proving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the
State.' ' 317 While recognizing that the difference between expendi-
tures made in pursuit of those objectives and illegitimate expendi-
tures "will not always be easy to discern," 318 the Court noted that the
extreme ends of the spectrum are identifiable 319 and that reasonable
procedures could be adopted by the State Bar to insure that dissenting
attorneys were not compelled to support ideological causes with
which they disagreed.32 °
The Court's analysis in Keller reflects a fundamentally different
approach to the First Amendment than Bellotti. In the latter, the
Court conceives of the relevant First Amendment interests as be-
longing to the recipients of corporate political speech. If the Keller
Court had taken a similar tact, the result in that case would have been
different. The State Bar would offer the public perspectives and
information they might not otherwise receive or would benefit from
hearing. From the standpoint of recipient interests, the freedom of
speech would best be preserved by allowing unfettered political
speech by the State Bar, no matter how it is funded.
In contrast, the First Amendment approach taken in Keller em-
phasized the free speech and association interests of the members of
the Bar. Rather than looking merely at the speech recipients' inter-
ests, the Keller Court looked to the State Bar members' right to
315. See id. at6n.2.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 14 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plu-
rality opinion)).
318. Id. at 15.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 16-17.
BEYOND BELLOTTI
refuse to finance political speech with which they disagreed.32' In
the context of corporate electoral speech, it seems appropriate to rec-
ognize that the free speech rights at issue are not merely those of the
public at large. Shareholders also have free speech and association
interests affected by corporate electoral speech.
The protection of dissenting members who financially contribute
to an organization for non-political purposes dictated the outcome of
a recent case involving student fees. Students at the University of
Wisconsin successfully challenged the school's use of their manda-
tory student fees to support ideological student groups.32 2 The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized the First Amendment
rights of the contributing students, rejecting altogether the Univer-
sity's claim that the organizations' free speech rights would be sacri-
ficed.
The Regents argue that the First Amendment protects the
rights of these organizations to engage in such speech. Of
course it does. But the students do not ask that we restrict
the speech of any student organization; they merely ask that
they not be forced to financially subsidize speech with
which they disagree.
323
Perhaps the student fees, union dues, and state bar fees should be
treated differently form corporate investments on the grounds that the
former are compelled by the state and the latter are not. Certainly,
the former were analyzed as forms of state action, while the latter are
not. In practice, the role of the state in each of these circumstances is
similar: state law grants an organization the right to charge members
for joining and the organization in turn attempts to spend that money
on political speech. In the union dues cases, state law allows the
union to set dues; in state bar fees cases, state law allows the bar to
charge membership fees; in student fees cases, state law allows the
university to charge student activity fees; in corporate speech cases,
state law allows the corporation to charge individuals for the privi-
lege of investing. The state law does not require any of the organi-
zations to charge a set amount. The organizations themselves decide
321. See id. at 9-10.
322. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998).
323. Id. at 721.
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whether to charge and how much-although corporate equities, once
issued at the corporation's set price, are then sold on the open mar-
ket.
In none of these scenarios does the state force anyone to join. It
is up to the individual to make the free choice whether to go to work
at a union shop, practice law as a profession, attend this particular
university, or invest in a corporation. Simply because joining is vol-
untary is no reason to limit the members' First Amendment right not
to financially support political speech.
Indeed, there are situations in which a dissenting shareholder has
even less choice in joining than the union member, lawyer, or univer-
sity student. Each of the last three know in advance the nature of the
organization they are joining. An employee who has a pension fund,
however, does not know in advance where her money will be in-
vested. She invests in her pension fund blindly. And once she has
invested, she does not know where her money will be invested
later-that is, which corporations she will become a "member" of.
Thus, some corporate investors have less freedom of choice to join
than other individuals who have found protection in organizational
dues cases.
The lesson of the organizational dues cases is that the financial
supporters of an association do not give up their own First Amend-
ment rights of freedom of association and speech simply because
they supply money to the group. When we add to that lesson the di-
lemmas facing shareholders who dissent from corporate electoral
speech-from lacking control over their investments to discovering
political speech to selling shares after the damage has been done 324-
an associational approach to corporate electoral speech furnishes
Austin's "other people's money" corruption with a First Amendment
framework. Moreover, we can also see the limitations of Bellotti's
theory of the First Amendment, which failed to extend past the rights
of listeners to include the rights of those paying for expenditures.
324. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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IV. EvEN FURTHER BEYOND BELLOTTI: SOME REFLECTIONS ON
ARGENBRIGHT, CORPORATE PACs, AND SOFT MONEY
Since Bellotti, both judicial doctrine and electoral politics have
changed considerably, and the three pillars of Justice Powell's opin-
ion have been modified and supplemented. To the extent the pillars
still stand, they provide only weak support for the rule of law built
upon them.325 The Court has gone beyond Bellotti, and we know the
direction it took. Several questions remain, however, and this section
addresses three of them. First, is the Montana law constitutional?
Second, does the Court's post-Bellotti approach mandate changes in
the organization and maintenance of corporate PACs? Finally, does
the First Amendment allow regulation of soft money contributions to
parties by business corporations?
A. Judging Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright
Current litigation over Montana's corporate electoral speech
regulation provides an opportunity to assess the viability of Bellotti.
In deciding the Montana case, the courts will first have to determine
whether Bellotti has any continuing precedential force and, if so, how
much. They will then have to determine whether the particulars of
the Montana law render it constitutionally infirm.
What then of Bellotti? It seems that its three pillars have been
rendered too weak to support unlimited First Amendment protection
for corporate initiative speech. If it is construed to mean that states
cannot regulate the electoral speech of business corporations in any
way, Bellotti is no longer good law. We know that under Austin
states can regulate the funding of corporate electoral speech for can-
didates.326 Nevertheless, Bellotti cannot be entirely discarded; Austin
did not explicitly overrule Bellotti and even cited it for precedential
authority.
Instead, District Judge Lovell and the appellate courts can make
the best sense of Austin by reading Bellotti narrowly. The preceden-
tial value of Bellotti could be limited to its precise holding that a
complete ban on corporate political speech in the context of ballot
325. See supra Part III.
326. See supra Part II.B.
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campaigns is unconstitutional. The Court itself has distinguished
Bellotti from source-of-funding restrictions on this ground.327
Unlike Massachusetts, Montana has not enacted a complete ban
on corporate initiative speech. Like Michigan, it has adopted a
source-of-funding rule for the speech.328 Under Montana's law, cor-
porations can still sponsor initiative speech, but it must be paid for by
separate funds designated for political purposes. Thus, the law seems
to fit more comfortably with Austin than with Bellotti. And if, as
discussed earlier, other people's money corruption occasions no rea-
son to distinguish candidate-centered independent expenditures from
initiative-centered expenditures, 329 the Montana law should be
judged primarily by reference to Austin.
Yet, this does not avoid the constitutional troubles for the Mon-
tana law; indeed, Austin reveals precisely why the Montana law is
constitutionally infirm. Its major defect is that it applies equally to
all corporations, with no exception for corporations designed for
purposes of advocacy. 330 Both MCFL and Austin require that advo-
cacy groups organized through the corporate form be allowed to use
general treasury funds to finance electoral speech.331 By failing to
distinguish among corporations, the Montana law unnecessarily
reaches protected speech where other people's money corruption is
not threatened. As a result, it violates the First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine.
Under the First Amendment, a law is facially invalid if it "does
not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state
control" and "sweeps within its ambit other activities that ... con-
stitute an exercise" of free speech.332 Although the Montana legis-
lature was within its regulatory authority in imposing source-of-
funding limits on business corporations, it exceeds its boundaries by
reaching the speech of non-profit advocacy groups. (Some observers
327. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 259 n.12 (1986).
328. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
330. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-236(1) (1997).
331. See supra notes 51-73 and accompanying text; see also Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 651-65 (1990).
332. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (invalidating anti-
picketing law because it did not exempt peaceful picketing).
212
BEYOND BELLOTTI
of Montana politics have alleged that the legislature, forced to enact a
law regulating corporate initiative speech by a ballot measure, crafted
the law broadly to apply to non-profit advocacy groups in a purpose-
ful effort to make it constitutionally untenable.333 )
The Montana plaintiffs do not count among them any non-profit
advocacy groups, but the party business corporations can litigate the
rights of non-parties since their claims involve a First Amendment
overbreadth challenge. 334 Due to the chilling effect of overbroad
laws on protected speech caused by a fear of prosecution, third par-
ties are allowed to challenge an overbroad statute for facial uncon-
stitutionality.
335
Montana may contend that any overbreadth in the language of
the statute can be remedied in application. Either the state will not
prosecute the initiative speech of non-profit advocacy groups fi-
nanced with general treasury funds, or the courts can preserve such
groups' speech rights by determining, on a case-by-case basis,
whether the relevant group is appropriately covered by the law. Yet,
this defense is not enough to salvage the statute. Non-profit advo-
cacy groups cannot depend on the vague promise of non-prosecution,
and "gradually cutting away the unconstitutional aspects of a statute
by invalidating its improper applications ... does not respond suffi-
ciently to the peculiarly vulnerable character of activities protected
by the First Amendment. ' 336 In both cases, the chilling effect on
non-profit advocacy groups remains.
To salvage the Montana law, the courts can sever and declare
unconstitutional the law's facial application to advocacy corpora-
tions. The law's application to business corporations however is
appropriately in pursuit of preventing other people's money corrup-
tion. Nevertheless, the law remains too broad because it does not
provide an exemption for business corporations that can show
unanimous shareholder approval for their initiative speech. Recall
that Austin's version of corruption, if taken to its logical extension,
333. See Peter Callaghan, Limits Simply Will Not Work on Ballot Proposi-
tions, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA), Nov. 2, 1997, at C12.
334. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985).
335. See id.
336. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-27, at
1023 (2d ed. 1988).
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invites an evidentiary inquiry into the existence of shareholder sup-
port. If all the shareholders approve of the speech-and in close cor-
porations covered by the Montana regulation such approval may be
obtained relatively easily-the corporation should be allowed to
make its initiative expenditures. The courts should either practice the
art of the judicial craft by creating a corporate defense to prosecution,
or hold the law to be insufficiently tailored to meet other people's
money corruption.
B. Corporate PACs: Fund-Raising and Administration
The post-Bellotti developments do not only require a rethinking
of corporate initiative speech regulation. They may also require reas-
sessment of the design and administration of corporate PACs. If
Austin's conceptualization of corruption and the First Amendment
analogy to organizational dues cases are valid, two questions arise.
First, do the organizational dues cases suggest constitutional ways in
which a corporation can raise PAC money? Second, can corpora-
tions continue to pay the administration fees of their PACs through
general treasury funds?
If laws regulating the source of funding for corporate electoral
speech are constitutional, it is possible that more states will follow
Michigan and Montana in adopting regulation. In turn, corporations
will increasingly rely on PACs to finance speech. Currently, PACs
solicit money from officers, employees, and shareholders3 37 and they
can be quite successful at raising substantial sums. Figures compiled
a decade ago-and which have certainly been far surpassed since-
show that corporate PACs raised over $50 million for congressional
candidates alone in 1988. In his concurrence in Austin, Justice
Brennan noted that "the segregated fund requirement [in Michigan]
had not burdened significantly the [Chamber of Commerce's] speech
with respect to candidate-oriented expenditures.
'" 339
Business corporations, like unions, can compile the funds neces-
sary to advance political causes, such as ballot initiatives, by any
337. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(4) (1994) (detailing from whom corporations can
solicit PAC money). In practice, shareholders are rarely solicited.
338. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 591.
339. Austin, 494 U.S. at 676 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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number of means. For example, they can send direct solicitations to
employees, officers, and shareholders. 340 Assuming business corpo-
rations need to raise even more money under a system of increasing
regulation of corporate electoral speech funding, they have several
additional options. One possibility is to deduct small amounts from
dividend payments to stockholders. 341 Another is to deduct from the
employee payroll, with the informed consent of the employee. Like
unions,342 business corporations who raise money by these alterna-
tive methods should be required to offer stockholders and employees
the ability to opt out of supporting the PAC. To avoid the corruption
of converting other people's money, business corporations must af-
ford stockholders and employees the right to abstain.
In a major corporation, such as the Walt Disney Company, even
a small deduction from shareholder dividends could raise a substan-
tial amount of money. Disney has approximately two billion shares
in circulation. 3  Thus, a fraction of a cent deduction from each divi-
dend payment would enable the corporation to fund a considerable
amount of electoral speech. Dividend withholdings will be reflected
in the stock price, of course, and potentially diminish shareholder
value. Good corporate management will take market considerations
into account when financing corporate electoral speech. And
corporations remain able to raise money through ordinary voluntary
contributions solicited from employees, officers, and shareholders.
Nevertheless, recognition of Austin corruption may mean further
limits ought to be imposed on the administration of corporate PACs.
Under federal law, corporations can use general treasury funds to
sponsor corporate PACs and pay for their administrative expenses.
344
In the words of Professor Lowenstein, "[t]his is no trivial advantage,
340. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C).
341. Granted, corporations may be hesitant to directly charge shareholders
for electoral speech expenditures. But this does not speak to the constitution-
ality of doing so.
342. See supra Part III.C.3.
343. THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 61 (as of Sept.
30, 1997, 683,000,000 shares issued; as of publication, stock had since split
three for one; see Disney's 3-for-i Split Approved, WALL ST. J., June 10,
1998, at B5).
344. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C); see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 2, at
591.
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as the administrative expenses often exceed the money received from
contributors and donated [by the PAC] to candidates. ' 345
If we accept the proposition that corruption arises from the con-
version of shareholder's money when general treasury funds of a
business corporation are used for electoral speech,346 it would seem
to cast a long shadow on corporate funding of PACs. After all, both
the administration of a PAC and independent spending on politics
accomplish the same goal: furthering political speech in elections. If
they are both financed by general treasury funds, they work the same
evil of corruption. 347 For stockholders, there is little difference be-
tween seeing their money support a PAC that distributes money to
electoral causes they object to, and seeing their money go directly
towards electoral expenditures. Corporations could still establish
PACs in their name, but shareholders would not be required to pay
for them.
It is a reasonable extension of the notion of corruption by con-
version to require corporate PACs to finance their operations in the
same way unaffiliated PACs do, through the raising of money from
voluntary contributors. Corporate PACs, however, face limitations
that outside groups do not. Corporate PACs have a limited scope of
people they can solicit money from, whereas an unaffiliated PAC can
solicit virtually anyone.348 It may be that this discrimination is also
subject to revision in light of Austin's corruption standard; soliciting
money from outsiders poses no threat of corruption by conversion
(although it may pose other dangers). In any case, shareholders
should not be required to support the administration of a corporate
PAC without the opportunity to abstain.
C. Soft Money
Post-Bellotti developments also invite campaign finance reforms
on corporate soft money contributions. "Soft money" refers to the
345. LOWENsTEIN, supra note 2, at 591.
346. Writing before Austin, but after MCFL, Professor Nicholson also sug-
gested that limits on corporations using general treasury funds to pay PAC ad-
ministrative expenses "should be found constitutional on the authority of Mas-
sachusetts Citizens for Life." See Nicholson, supra note 44, at 603.
347. See Brudney, supra note 154, at 272 n.133.
348. Compare 2 U.S.C § 441a, with 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4).
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contributions corporations, individuals, and others give to the politi-
cal parities, ostensibly for party-building activities. It is distinct from
"hard money": direct contributions to candidates. Soft money given
for the party's use (not the candidates'), has no limits under federal
law, and is generally unregulated.349 Soft money has only recently
become the subject of campaign finance reform debate, due mainly to
the watershed election of 1996.350
Two features of the 1996 election brought the issue of soft
money to the fore. First, the election season witnessed an unprece-
dented amount of soft money donations to the parties. During the
race, the Democratic Party raised and spent approximately $120 mil-
lion in soft money and the Republican Party raised and spent nearly
$150 million."' Much of this spending was on issue advertisements
specifically designed to help the presidential candidates. Second, the
presidential candidates themselves organized massive soft money
fund-raising efforts to finance the party advertisements. The candi-
dates admitted to donors that their soft money contributions were es-
sential to furthering the candidates' electoral chances-indeed, that
was their main selling point.352 Not only did the candidates actively
raise soft money, they and their campaigns conceived of the ads and
managed their production and distribution. President Clinton, for
example, was called "the day-to-day operational director of our TV-
ad campaign" by his campaign advisor, Dick Morris.
353
The party issue advertisement campaigns enabled the candidates
to circumvent the public financing bargain each had agreed to. Both
candidates agreed to voluntary spending limits in exchange for public
funds. These thinly-veiled endorsements were essential parts of the
349. See Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 (1998) [hereinafter Soft Money].
350. See generally id. at 1332-36.
351. See David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line
Between Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. &
POL. 33, 92-93 (1998); see also Soft Money, supra note 349, at 1333.
352. See Jill Abramson, Tape Shows Clinton Involvement in Party-Paid Ads,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997, at A20 (detailing President Clinton's soft money
fund-raising pitch to potential contributors). See also, Soft Money, supra note
349, at 1334.
353. RICHARD S. MoRRIs, BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE: WINNING THE
PRESIDENCY N THE NINETIES 144 (1997).
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campaigns but did not count against the spending limits. The candi-
dates' efforts appear to reflect a conspiracy by each to evade the vol-
untary spending limits.
The coordination of soft money-financed issue advertisements
with presidential candidates raises numerous issues, most notably a
potential for the type of quidpro quo corruption the Court referred to
in Buckley as a justification for contribution limits. If candidates
make direct appeals for huge, six-figure soft money donations that go
to support their campaigns, they can become beholden to larger con-
tributors in precisely the same way as if the money was contributed
as hard money. But whether or not campaign reformers ban soft
money contributions outright, Austin's notion of corruption would
justify efforts to regulate such contributions from corporations.
The current lack of regulation.means that business corporations
can-and do-contribute large sums to the major political parties in
the form of soft money. Corporate soft money can be used by the
parties to pay for up to thirty-five percent of their administrative ex-
penses in presidential election years,354 and no doubt corporate soft
money was used in 1996 to finance party issue advertisements.
Under Austin, a reasonable source-of-financing rule regarding
corporate soft money contributions to parties could survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. Prohibiting general treasury funds from being con-
tributed to the parties as soft money would meet the state's goal of
preventing corruption by conversion. Indeed, current rules allow
such corruption by enabling corporations to use general treasury
funds for soft money contributions.
V. CONCLUSION
In looking back to Bellotti, we can see that the basic holding of
the Court-that complete bans on corporate initiative speech are un-
constitutional-remains intact. The structure of the Court's reason-
ing, however, has been substantially weakened. Of the three main
pillars relied upon by the Court, each has been significantly modified
or weakened by post-Bellotti developments. Conceptually, corrup-
tion has been redefined, or rather a new layer added to the old. The
notion that corruption can be caused by the wrongful political use of
354. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2)(i) (1998).
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other people's money slowly developed, from a mention in Buckley
to extended discussions in Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Aus-
tin. Adding to the traditional conception of corruption as financial
quid pro quo between contributor and candidate, MCFL and Austin
recognized the danger of a different type of corruption posed by the
separation of ownership and control in the modem corporation. Al-
though Austin's language is susceptible to varying interpretation, I
have argued here that the core evil that the holding is designed to
combat is corruption by conversion of shareholder money.
Bellotti's evidence-of-corporate-dominance pillar is perhaps the
weakest of any remaining part of the Court's reasoning. Subsequent
cases have avoided looking at such evidence perhaps because of the
inability of empirical research to answer the question definitively.
Several scholarly attempts have been made, but it remains difficult to
isolate the effect of corporations as corporations rather than as per-
suasive, reason-giving participants in public debate. The potential
for corporate domination over the initiative process may perhaps only
be understood by reference to the larger context of voter attributes
and the mass media environment. In the wake of Austin, with its
emphasis on shareholders' rights, it appears however that Bellotti and
its academic respondents were asking the wrong question.
If the evidentiary pillar of Bellotti has crumbled, the theoretical
pillar is in need of modification to reflect Austin's concern with
shareholder rights. In terms of First Amendment theory, the Court
should no longer emphasize the controversial notion of hearers'
rights in the marketplace of ideas. The most notable contender to the
hearers' rights theory, constitutive theory, supports regulation of the
corporate voice along Austin lines, despite the defense offered by
Professor Redish and Mr. Wasserman. We may be able to make the
best sense of MCFL and Austin, however, by crafting a First
Amendment theory of shareholder rights by analogy to organizational
dues cases. Here the focus is shifted from the rights of the corpora-_
tion to the rights of the corporation's owners.
For the courts to adequately assess the constitutionality of Mon-
tana's regulation of the corporate voice in the initiative process, they
must take into account the Court's moves beyond Bellotti. The state
will attempt to use those moves to buttress its case, but those same
moves lead to the conclusion that Montana's law on its face violates
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the First Amendment due to overbreadth. It is also conceivable that
those moves will enable further regulation of corporate PAC funding
and administration expenses, and can also justify limits on corporate
soft money contributions to parties. These potential reforms suggest
that while the Court has moved beyond Bellotti in allowing regula-
tion of the corporate voice in politics, there may still be far to go.
